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Foreword
This is the first issue in the Occasional Paper
Series of the European Central Bank (ECB).
This new communication tool is aimed at
presenting policy-relevant topics to a wide
audience, including other policy-makers,
academics, the media and the general public.
Occasional Papers will be longer than articles
in the ECB Monthly Bulletin and will therefore
allow for a more elaborate analysis. They will
be able to serve as a future source of
reference and make public material used by
the ECB and the Eurosystem. Occasional
Papers will always contain work carried out
by ECB staff and will be published in the
name of the authors. They are, as it were,
part of the background to the decision-making
process. The ECB as an institution need not,
therefore, subscribe to (all) the views
expressed by the authors. In other words,
there will always be a disclaimer.
By contrast with ECB Working Papers,
Occasional Papers are not intended to
present original contributions to economic
theory. Of course, authors may, and often
will, use old and new economic theories and
empirical methodologies to present their
results or to underpin their conclusions. The
analysis aims to be both sound and
comprehensive.
ECB Occasional Papers will be published on
our website and will also be available in
hard copy. This new series fills a gap in
our publications framework. The publication
of Occasional Papers is yet another
demonstration of the ECB’s policy of being
as open and transparent as is both possible
and responsible. I am confident in the hope
that these Occasional Papers will find their
way to many interested readers.
Dr. W. F. DuisenbergECB Occasional Paper Series No. 1 • July 2000 6
Introduction
The Eurosystem has a keen interest in the
development of financial markets and, in
particular, in full advantage being taken of all
the potential benefits resulting from the
introduction of the euro.
In the second half of 1999, with the aim of
making a first assessment of the level of
integration and efficiency of the euro area
money and bond markets after the
introduction of the euro, the European
Central Bank (ECB) and the national central
banks (NCBs) of the European Union carried
out within the Market Operations Committee
(MOC) an analysis of the functioning of these
markets, based on a set of studies on money
and bond markets. Moreover, an analysis both
of the infrastructural developments and of
barriers to market integration in the euro
area has been conducted by the Securities
Settlement Systems Policy Division of the
ECB and discussed in the Payment and
Settlement Systems Committee. The  money
market study was co-ordinated by Elisabeth
Pauly of the Banque de France and Javier
Aritzegui of the Banco de España, and the
bond market study by Jos Heuvelman of De
Nederlandsche Bank. The groups preparing
these studies included representatives from
six NCBs (the Banca d’Italia, the Banco de
España, the Banque de France, the Deutsche
Bundesbank, the Nationale Bank van België/
Banque Nationale de Belgique and De
Nederlandsche Bank) and from the ECB, and
were finalised in December 1999. This Paper
was prepared by Javier Santillán (Sections I
and II) and Marc Bayle and Christian Thygesen
(Section III) of the ECB.1 This Paper draws to
a large extent on these studies and has been
complemented by data collected by the ECB
and other sources, in order to provide a
more complete picture. Its aim is to present
an overview of the euro area money and
bond markets as they stood around a year
after the introduction of the euro, and to
point out a number of fields in which further
integration can be achieved. The contribution
of this Paper to the discussion of financial
market developments in the euro area is
limited in several respects: first, its approach
is descriptive rather than analytical; second,
it only looks in a thorough way at the bulk of
the money market, while the treatment of
the bond and the repo markets is less
developed, and other parts of the financial
markets, for instance the equity market, are
not covered at all; third, the period of
observation is much too short to derive
definitive conclusions; and, fourth, while the
impact of the introduction of the euro has
obviously been a major catalyst for change,
no systematic attempt is made to distinguish,
within the developments identified, between
those resulting from the introduction of the
euro and those which would have taken place
in any case.
1 The comments received from Denis Blenck, Peter Bull, Vítor
Gaspar, Gert Jan Hogeweg, Lex Hoogduin, Klaus Löber, Arnaud
Marès, Francesco Papadia, Daniela Russo, Antonio Sáinz de
Vicuña, Jean-Louis Schirmann and the anonymous referees of
the ECB Occasional Paper Series as well as the comments and
technical support provided by Maria Encío and Marco Laganá,
are gratefully acknowledged. Any remaining errors are the sole
responsibility of the authors. The views expressed by the authors
do not necessarily reflect those of the European Central Bank or
the European System of Central Banks.7 ECB Occasional Paper Series No. 1 • July 2000
The Eurosystem has a keen interest in the
development of financial markets and, in
particular, in full advantage being taken of all
the potential benefits resulting from the
introduction of the euro. A key requirement
for the efficient achievement of the primary
objective of the European Central Bank
(ECB), namely the maintenance of price
stability, is for monetary policy impulses to
be transmitted in a smooth and homogeneous
way throughout the euro area by means of
efficient and integrated money and bond
markets. This Paper mainly aims to contribute
to the debate as to whether or not the level
of integration of the euro money and bond
markets is appropriate. It may also provide a
preliminary contribution to other broader
discussions, such as the gains in efficiency of
the euro area financial system in relation to
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).
The first two chapters of this Paper describe
developments in money and bond markets
since the introduction of the euro. A third
chapter analyses the market infrastructure
and the barriers restricting the integration of
those markets, as well as some possible
actions to improve the situation. Two main
caveats to the discussion stem from the fact
that, on the one hand, the period of
observation is too short for a definitive
assessment of the structural developments
highlighted in the Paper, and, on the other,
no systematic attempt is made to make
a distinction, within the developments
identified, between those resulting from
the introduction of the euro and those
which would have taken place in any case.
Still, the evidence collected suggests that the
euro is having profound effects on the
European financial markets, with pervasive
consequences not only on their functioning,
but also on their contribution to the overall
efficiency of the economic system.
The euro money market
As far as the euro money market is
concerned, the situation prevailing at the start
of Stage Three of EMU in the various
Executive summary and main
conclusions
segments of the market varied with regard to
their potential integration, owing to both the
different nature of the instruments exchanged
and institutional peculiarities. Accordingly, the
gains in terms of integration, efficiency and
liquidity achieved in each of the markets
analysed here during the first year of Stage
Three of EMU also varied. In the cash and
derivative money markets, the introduction
of the euro and the new monetary policy
framework triggered major developments,
leading to a much more advanced degree of
unification and standardisation. This is exactly
what one would have expected from the
introduction of a common currency.
In broad terms the money market performed
its main function efficiently, namely
redistributing the liquidity allocated by the
Eurosystem to its counterparties in monetary
policy operations throughout the euro area.
Hence, as far as the wholesale market for
interbank liquidity is concerned, there were
no significant distortions which could have
prevented the monetary policy transmission
mechanism from working smoothly, and at
least some of the potential efficiency gains
derived from the increased scale of the money
market have already been achieved. Signs of a
good degree of integration were apparent
from several sources, including market
participants’ responses to the market surveys
conducted by the European System of Central
Banks (ESCB); the smooth and balanced
pattern of the use by the Eurosystem’s
counterparties of its standing facilities, which
showed no geographical distortions; and the
efficient arbitrage of short-term interest
rates. The significant increase in cross-border
transactions in the euro money market since
the start of Stage Three of EMU points in the
same direction.
Liquidity improved in the unsecured and repo
segments of the money market compared
with the situation prevailing in the former
domestic markets. As a rule, contract sizes
rose sharply. The unsecured and swap
segments melted quickly into a single market
mainly on account of the success of euro
area indices (the EONIA and the EURIBOR)ECB Occasional Paper Series No. 1 • July 2000 8
and the efficient functioning of TARGET.
Although less integrated, the repo market
also underwent significant developments,
while the market for short-term securities
lagged behind in terms of both integration
and the degree of development. This may
have been caused by differences in the
development of the infrastructure supporting
the different market segments. In 1999 traded
volumes in the unsecured and repo markets
expanded globally compared with 1998. By
contrast, the volume of foreign currency
swaps declined owing to the disappearance
of cross-currency trading among the euro
legacy currencies. However, the joint
expansion of unsecured and secured
transactions exceeded the decrease in the
trade in foreign currency swaps. The growth
of the unsecured segment of the market was
particularly concentrated in overnight
transactions. For longer maturities, repo
transactions seemed to be preferred to
unsecured transactions. Euro-denominated
money market derivatives such as swaps and
futures experienced a process of quick
standardisation and integration and their
depth increased substantially, while over-the-
counter transactions diminished.
In the market for short-term securities,
privately issued securities overtook the short-
term government paper market. The issuance
and the amount outstanding of Treasury bills
declined, but this decline was more than
offset by the increase in the amount
outstanding of euro-denominated private
securities. The markets for short-term
securities within the euro area remain rather
fragmented. In these markets, the behaviour
of investors, who are barely active in the
secondary market, tends to restrain liquidity.
However, some signs of integration in the
private paper segment of the market have
been  observed.
The joint effect of the single monetary policy
and the consolidation and merger process
under way in the European banking sector
has fostered the concentration and
reorganisation of cash management and, more
broadly, of money market activities. In the
money markets some major players, which
had previously focused on their domestic
market or on the most active European
markets, naturally extended the scope of their
activities to the whole euro area.
The euro bond market
As far as the euro bond market is concerned,
technical aspects of the start of Stage Three
of EMU, such as the re-denomination and
re-conventioning of bonds denominated in
the euro legacy currencies into euro-
denominated bonds, worked smoothly and
were hardly seen as an issue by market
participants.
While the pace of EMU-driven developments
in the bond market can be expected to be
slower than in the case of the money market,
evidence available so far indicates that very
significant changes took place or were under
way just a year after the start of Stage Three.
Major changes in the European bond market
were expected as a result of the combination
of economies of scale and increased
homogeneity. Such changes included supply-
side innovation, in the form of innovative
competition with regard to issuing techniques
and some aspects of secondary market
organisation, and increased diversification of
bonds’ portfolios through the euro area
driven by investor demand.
Indeed, the combination of these factors gave
rise to significant results in several fields: the
market became bigger and more integrated
and the average size of individual issues
increased; the sovereign bond segment
became more homogeneous and signs of
increased integration were perceived in other
segments; private issuer activity overtook that
of sovereign issuers, which had traditionally
dominated the bond market; the process of
increased diversification of investors’
portfolios initiated before the start of Stage
Three of EMU intensified; some signs of
increased opportunities for access to the
capital markets by new sectors of the
economy formerly absent from them (in9 ECB Occasional Paper Series No. 1 • July 2000
particular small and medium-sized enterprises
and high-growth corporations) were
observed; and secondary market liquidity
improved. The trading volumes of euro-
denominated bond futures contracts have
increased dramatically since the beginning of
1999. The euro-denominated issuance of
international bonds in 1999 was higher than
US dollar denominated issuance. However,
despite the substantial progress made in the
first year of Stage Three when compared with
the US corporate bond market, that of the
euro area still lags behind with regard to
liquidity and market completeness, and some
market segments remain underdeveloped,
particularly those for lower credit ratings and
non-rated debt. The overall size of the market
is still relatively small in comparison with the
United States.
Overall, the euro bond market is starting to
become an important source of finance for
the private sector and, in particular, for
corporations, thus complementing the
growing role played by the short-term
securities market in this same respect.
Virtuous interaction between many of the
above-mentioned factors could ultimately be
expected to bring about a reduction in the
costs of financing through the euro capital
market.
As in the case of money market activities,
most financial intermediaries active in the
bond market carried out the internal
reorganisation of their bond trading desks to
adapt them to a euro area-based approach.
The euro money and bond market
infrastructure
This Paper describes the main features of the
infrastructure of the euro money and bond
markets and identifies and analyses the main
barriers to the integration of the markets.
Most of the barriers identified do not seem
to be specific to these markets, but concern
the integration of the euro securities market
infrastructure more generally. It is also
acknowledged that the infrastructure alone
cannot explain the varying degrees of
integration in the different markets. Time will
be needed to change business practices and
to agree on and implement new partnerships,
as well as to take full advantage of the new
possibilities available.
Special attention is paid to the
securities trading, clearing and settlement
infrastructure, which is still predominantly
domestic with very few truly euro area
structures. So far, the euro area has
become a “domestic” market without its
“domestic infrastructure”. A more harmonised
infrastructure would also ensure a level
playing-field for market participants providing
equal access to all euro area collateral.
In particular, this Paper identifies some
actions aimed at enhancing the integration of
the securities market infrastructure and,
therefore, at increasing the integration of
euro money and financial markets.
First of all, the development of cross-border
settlement structures either in the form of
efficient links between securities settlement
systems (SSSs) or through cross-border
mergers is still under development. The first
step would be the establishment of links
between the systems which should be able to
ensure the synchronised intraday settlement
with finality of both the securities side and
the payment side of securities transactions
(intraday delivery versus payment – or
DVP – links).
A fully compatible and more standardised
legal framework and documentation for
the interbank and central bank repo
markets would help to integrate further  the
market for collateralised operations. The
homogenisation of practices in securities
markets (including fiscal regimes and
regulation) should also be encouraged.
The effect of the lack of harmonisation in
the SSSs’ procedures – in particular for
transactions involving repos and debt
instruments – should be further documented
and analysed, and the areas in which theECB Occasional Paper Series No. 1 • July 2000 10
further harmonisation of clearing and
settlement procedures is necessary should
be identified. In the same vein, the effect of
the lack of harmonisation between central
bank procedures for collateralisation should
be analysed further and initiatives to
harmonise practices may be necessary.
Finally, market integration should benefit
from the emergence of a more efficient
clearing function in the euro area. The optimal
solution seems to be for a global clearing
house providing services to all the SSSs and
focusing its activity on the clearing of
operations other than intraday operations.
It will be up to the market participants and
service providers to come up with the most
efficient solutions for the integration of the
infrastructure and, thus, of the markets.
Increasing  awareness of the issues at stake
and describing and analysing the possible
solutions represent ways of promoting this
common aim.11 ECB Occasional Paper Series No. 1 • July 2000
Before Monetary Union, much curiosity and
different points of view surrounded the effect
on financial markets of the introduction of
the euro. As regards the money market,
attention  focused, in particular, on questions
such as how smoothly the money market
would integrate after the start of Stage Three
of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU),
whether money markets would  perform their
role efficiently in the monetary policy
transmission process, and to what extent
EMU would affect the efficiency of the euro
money market compared with that of the
predecessor money markets. The question of
money market integration is seen as a
precondition for the smooth and homogeneous
transmission of the monetary policy impulses
throughout the euro area which, in turn, fulfils
a necessary condition for the efficient
achievement of the primary objective of the
European Central Bank (ECB), namely the
maintenance of price stability. Indeed, an
integrated money market is necessary for the
distribution of liquidity among credit
institutions throughout the euro area and,
thus, for the conduct of the single monetary
policy. In turn, the integration of the money
market interacts virtuously with the
functioning of large-value payment systems in
general, and TARGET in particular, thereby
contributing to the fulfilment of the
requirement of the Treaty establishing the
European Community to ensure the smooth
functioning of payment systems.
A definitive answer to these questions will
only come after some time, with the gradual
accumulation of empirical evidence on the
effects of the introduction of the euro. This
section aims at providing some evidence by
describing the developments which have
taken place in the money market since the
euro was introduced.
The most significant segments of the money
market are examined here, namely the
unsecured deposit market (where credit
institutions exchange short-term liquidity
without the guarantee of collateral2); the
repo market (in which market participants
exchange short-term liquidity against
I The euro money market
collateral), the swap market (in which fixed
interest rate payments are exchanged for
floating interest rate payments), the futures
markets for short-term instruments, and the
markets for short-term securities, including
Treasury bills, commercial paper (CP),
certificates of deposit (CDs) and other assets.
As will be seen, at the start of Stage Three of
EMU, the condition of the various money
market segments differed greatly with regard to
their potential integration, owing to the different
nature of the instruments exchanged, as well as
peculiarities regarding market participants and
other institutional factors.
The gains in terms of integration, efficiency
and liquidity achieved in each of the markets
analysed following the introduction of the
euro depend on a number of factors such as:
the degree of proximity of each market
to monetary policy implementation; the
structure of the market (i.e. mainly interbank
versus a customer-oriented structure,
centralised versus an over-the-counter –
OTC – or non-centralised structure); its
relative complexity (i.e. the number and
nature of instruments traded and market
participants); infrastructural developments;
and a number of regulatory, institutional and
historical features.
In the cash and derivative money markets,
the introduction of the euro and the new
monetary policy framework have either
triggered or accelerated some major
developments, leading to a high degree of
unification and standardisation. Some of the
driving forces underlying such processes were
already in place in 1998, in view of the
prospective transition to Stage Three of EMU,
but the introduction of the euro clearly
fostered them. Signs of integration in the
money market are evident from several
perspectives: a first indirect indication is
found in the pattern of the use by market
participants of the Eurosystem’s lending and
deposit facilities since the start of Stage
2 Annex 1 contains a glossary explaining the technical terms used
in this Paper.ECB Occasional Paper Series No. 1 • July 2000 12
Three. Simultaneous recourse to both
facilities has occurred only exceptionally,
barring the very early days of Stage Three,
which can be seen as an indicator that there
are no major integration-related problems in
the euro money market (see Section I.1.2.2);
on the prices side, the dispersion of
short-term interest rates (EONIA) prevailing
among euro area countries has been minimal
since early 1999. Interviews with market
participants in the context of the market
surveys3 of the European System of Central
Banks (ESCB) showed that, by the end of 1999,
the prevailing feeling was that the money
markets were fairly well integrated, especially
in the unsecured and swap segments.
Although less integrated, the repo market
also underwent significant developments,
while the market for short-term securities
lagged behind, remaining more fragmented
and less developed.
Overall, the money market efficiently
performs its function of distributing liquidity
among the various regions of the euro area
or, more relevantly, among the thousands of
Monetary Financial Institutions active in the
euro area. Hence, as far as the wholesale
market for interbank liquidity is concerned,
there were no significant distortions which
could have prevented the monetary policy
transmission mechanism from working
smoothly. However, at least some of the
potential efficiency gains derived from the
increased scale of the money market in terms
of enhanced liquidity and depth have
already been achieved. Thus, the ECB can
concentrate its attention on estimating the
amount of liquidity needed, at the aggregate
level, in the euro area as a whole.
However, as shown in this study, the
integration and standardisation of the money
market are not yet complete, and further
evolution can be expected. The solution to
some of the problems will require the active
involvement of market participants and
authorities. This is particularly the case for
the repo market, which, by virtue of its very
nature, suffers from all the impediments to
unification still in play at the different phases
of negotiation and settlement. Indeed,
advances in the infrastructure and legal
framework require the contribution of both
the public sector and the private sector. In
particular, the implementation of an efficient
link between SSSs, the unification of legal
documentation and the homogenisation of
practices in the bond market are needed to
enhance integration further.
1.1 The interbank unsecured and repo markets
This section focuses primarily on the major
changes brought about by the introduction of
the euro and by the implementation of a
single monetary policy on the interbank
unsecured and repo markets. Specifically, the
consequences of the Eurosystem operations
for these segments of the money market are
dealt with in Section I.1.1. Section I.1.2
describes developments in the unsecured and
repo markets such as the evolution of trading
volumes, the degree of integration and cross-
border transactions. Section I.1.3 describes
the functioning of the market.
1.1.1 Consequences of the
Eurosystem’s operations for the
market4
Since the start of Stage Three of EMU, the
Eurosystem has been providing liquidity to its
counterparties on the basis of the global
refinancing needs of the euro area,
independently of the liquidity situation
prevailing in each country. This implies that,
normally, the amounts allotted to banks in
3 Several market surveys of both a quantitative and a qualitative
nature were conducted by the ESCB in the context of the studies
referred to in the Foreword, see Annex 2 for details.
4 Some discussions on the effects of the single monetary policy on
the money market in various euro area countries can be found
in Ayuso et al. (2000); Banque de France (1999); and Deutsche
Bundesbank (2000); a general, although preliminary review may
be found in Santillán (1999).13 ECB Occasional Paper Series No. 1 • July 2000
individual countries do not exactly match
their refinancing needs. The local liquidity
imbalances resulting from this situation have
contributed to a significant increase in cross-
border transactions in the euro money
market since the start of Stage Three. Within
this general framework, two specific features
may improve understanding of the context in
which money market integration has been
developing since the start of Stage Three,
namely the number of bidders participating in
the Eurosystem’s tenders and the bidding
behaviour of the Eurosystem’s counterparties.
1.1.1.1 Number of bidders participating in
MROs
Overall, the number of bidders participating in the
main refinancing operations (MROs) decreased
in 1999 compared with the sum of those
participating in the regular operations conducted
in the second half of 1998 by the national central
banks (NCBs) currently forming the Eurosystem.
Several factors explain such a development:
• Organisational changes implemented by
some banks located in the euro area,
whereby their cash management and their
operations with the Eurosystem are
concentrated at a single location (this is
discussed further in Section I.1.3.2).
• New infrastructure requirements, such as
the condition of having access to a real-
time gross settlement (RTGS) system or
the Eurosystem’s tendering systems, have
in some cases discouraged small or
medium-sized banks from participating in
the Eurosystem’s operations.
• The ongoing restructuring process in
the banking sector, i.e. mergers and
acquisitions, is tending to reduce the
number of potential bidders.
• Uncertainty about the amount that each
counterparty will actually receive in the MRO in
the fixed rate tenders conducted until
21 June 2000 may also have deterred some
counterparties from participating in the tenders.
The lower number of bidders alone has
increased the need to redistribute liquidity
among euro area market participants, even if
the number of those participating in the
monetary policy operations remains very
large in comparison with the situation
prevailing in the United States, for instance.
1.1.1.2 Bidding behaviour
Compared with the second half of 1998, an
important increase in the amount bid by
counterparties took place in all euro area
countries in 1999, resulting in lower allotment
ratios in MROs compared with those
prevailing in the tender operations conducted
by individual euro area NCBs prior to Stage
Three. In some countries the increase
observed in the amount of bids posted by
counterparties was more than 200%.
To a small extent the increased bids were
the result of greater refinancing needs on the
part of banks. These, in turn, have essentially
increased for two reasons, namely the
significant increase in the level of reserve
requirements in some countries (such as
France and the Netherlands) and the fact that
some refinancing facilities were discontinued
with the changeover to the euro. In Germany,
in particular, the discount facility existing
before Stage Three provided approximately
one-third of the liquidity needed by the
banking sector.
The most important factor, however, in
explaining the increase in the bid amount
was a change in bidding behaviour of
the Eurosystem’s counterparties.5  This
was affected, in turn, by a number of
considerations:
• In fixed rate tenders (used throughout
1999 for MROs), participants have to guess
the allotment ratio (i.e. the ratio between
the actual allotment and the bids
5 No systematic discussion is attempted here of the issue of
bidding behaviour and the overbidding phenomenon. Bindseil
and Mercier (1999) or Nautz and Oechsler (1999) provide
discussions of this issue.ECB Occasional Paper Series No. 1 • July 2000 14
submitted) in order to forecast the amount
of liquidity they will actually receive. Such
ratios fluctuate depending on the bidding
put up by the other participants and the
ECB’s allotment decision.
• Active players in the money market try to
take advantage of any spread arising
between the MRO rate and the expected
overnight (EONIA) rate. The higher the
spread expected, the higher the amount of
the bids will be.
• The amount of collateral available has
expanded in Stage Three, also on account
of the possibility of its cross-border use.
For these reasons, the connection between
the financing needs of counterparties and the
amount allotted to them by the central bank
has become looser, therefore increasing the
role of the market in redistributing liquidity
among euro area credit institutions.
1.1.2 Main developments in the
unsecured and repo markets
Among the various segments of the euro
money market, the interbank, unsecured
deposit market has achieved the highest
degree of integration and, since the start of
Stage Three of EMU, has performed an
important role in ensuring the smooth
redistribution of liquidity among euro area
credit institutions irrespective of their
geographical location. The significant
peculiarities of the various domestic interbank
deposit markets at the end of 1998 nearly
disappeared in the few weeks following the
introduction of the euro.
In addition to the catalytic effect of the single
monetary policy and the harmonisation of
market practices associated with it, there are
two main reasons for this rapid integration:
i) The immediate and full success of euro
area indices, i.e. the EONIA and the
EURIBOR, which were broadly accepted
by all market participants.
ii) The good functioning of the settlement of
cross-border payments, mainly performed
through TARGET, which has allowed banks
to trade safely throughout the euro area.
In this context, the unsecured market became
highly liquid and deep, with very big deal
sizes, tight bid-ask spreads and equal interest
rates at the different locations, with the
exception of minimal differences, normally
well within the bid-ask spreads.
1.1.2.1 Trading volumes
As explained at the beginning of Section I,
some figures, including those upon which this
section is based, were collected through a
market survey and, therefore, must be seen
as being indicative only. However, a clear
trend of growing trading volumes in both the
unsecured and repo markets was identified,
whereas the use of foreign currency swaps
decreased (see Annex 2 for details of the
ESCB market surveys). Although discussion
here focuses on developments in the secured
and unsecured segments of the money
market, it is also worth considering foreign
currency swaps, as they are an important
instrument to which bank treasurers resort
to  fund banks’ activities.
In 1999 (second quarter data), traded
volumes in the unsecured and repo markets
expanded by more than 20% globally
compared with 1998 (fourth quarter data).
Specifically, the unsecured market increased
by 16% and the repo market by 24% (see
Chart 1). By contrast, foreign currency swaps
declined by 24% in the same period,
owing to the disappearance of cross-currency
trading among the euro legacy currencies.
Nevertheless, it should be noted that
currency swaps funding still represents 23%
of the total of the euro money market and is
comparable, in terms of size, with the repo
market.
The shares of each of the three instruments
in the total (see Chart 2) followed different
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currencies
Chart 1
Activity in the euro area deposit, repo and foreign currency swap markets
(1999 (Q4) compared with 1998 (Q2) 1))
Source: ESCB market surveys.
1) Relative size of average daily transactions. Basis 100: volume of transactions in the unsecured market in Q4 1998.
from 32% to 23%, while the share of
unsecured deposits grew from 48% to 53%
and that of repos grew from 20% to 24%.
All in all, the expansion of the unsecured and
secured transactions exceeded the decrease
in the foreign currency swaps (see Table 1 in
Annex 2 for details). While the expansion of
unsecured transactions was clearly related to
the single monetary policy, the expansion of
the repo market is also linked to the need to
limit credit exposures and reduce capital
needs. The involvement of new market
participants in this segment of the market,
owing to the introduction of the euro, can be
seen as a supportive factor.
The growth of the unsecured segment of the
market was concentrated at the shorter
maturities, indeed in overnight transactions,
which represented by far the largest share
of unsecured operations (see Chart 3 and
Table 1 in Annex 2). The overnight maturity
has increased significantly since the beginning
Chart 2
Deposit, repo and foreign currency swap markets as a share of total activity in the
euro area
(1999 (Q4) compared with 1998 (Q2))














in 1998 in 1999ECB Occasional Paper Series No. 1 • July 2000 16
of the year, with a 40% jump in volume
compared with the previous year. By contrast,
turnover at longer maturities, from one week
up to one year, declined markedly and
relatively low volumes are being traded at
the longer end.
For longer maturities, repo transactions seemed
to be preferred to unsecured transactions (see
Chart 3), as they provided greater security.
Repo operations for maturities over one day
have increased significantly since the end of
1998: they represented 34% of all money market
operations in the second quarter of 1999
compared with 24% in the fourth quarter of
1998. This change was particularly visible at
maturities of one month and three months
(with growth of 23% and 42%), even if daily
turnover remained, overall, relatively modest
compared with that at shorter maturities. At
the longer end, liquidity was generally more
reduced.
1.1.2.2 Degree of integration
One first, indirect sign of the integration of
the money market emerges from the use by
market participants of the Eurosystem’s credit
and deposit facilities since the start of
Stage Three of EMU, where no significant
imbalances (i.e. the use of the credit facility
in one or more countries and of the deposit
facility, simultaneously, in other countries,
which would indicate problems in the
distribution of liquidity within the euro area)
have been observed among euro area
countries.6
6 Simultaneous resort to both facilities has taken place within the
same country to a very small extent, indicating minor inefficiencies
in the functioning of the “local” markets on given days, rather
than an integration-related problem (see ECB (1999b)).
Chart 3
Deposit, repo and foreign currency swap markets as a share of total activity in the
euro area






























Source: ESCB market surveys.
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However, the integration prevailing in the
unsecured segment of the euro money market
from the early stages of Stage Three was
rather higher than that prevailing in the repo
market. While the available information for
the euro money markets is scarce on the
prices side, the EONIA (euro overnight index
average) provides a clear indicator for
overnight developments. The dispersion of
the EONIA prevailing among euro area
countries has been very small since early
1999. Only a few weeks after the start
of Monetary Union, the differences in the
average interest rates recorded by the
56 banks of the various countries of the euro
area participating in the EONIA panel
decreased, with some exceptions, to 2 to
4 basis points, i.e. below the usual bid-ask
spread. Furthermore, after a similarly short
period, less than half of the daily variance of
interest rates registered by the banks
participating in the EONIA panel could be
explained by differences between rates in
different countries (see the contribution of
inter-country variance in Chart 4), while the
rest was explained by differences between
individual credit institutions within each
country.
In the context of the ESCB market surveys,
market participants agreed that the repo
market was not as fully integrated within the
Chart 4
EONIA rate variance: contribution of inter-country variance to total variance
(percentage)
euro area as was the unsecured market.
Evidence of this was found in the hierarchy
prevailing for the general collateral rates
(“general collateral” is collateral which, owing
to its homogeneous features, is broadly
accepted); while the French and German
securities were rather “expensive”, the
opposite was the case for the Belgian, Spanish
and Italian ones. The most frequently invoked
reasons for this situation were the following:
• Differences in the yield of the underlying
bonds, especially on account of their
different degrees of liquidity. In particular,
the impact of “specials” (i.e. collateral
other than general collateral) trading,
which is largely done in German Bunds
and, to a lesser extent, in French OATs,
was often mentioned by counterparties to
explain their higher price in the repo
market in comparison with other collateral.
• The lack of harmonisation of repo
agreements throughout the euro area, with
the coexistence of domestic contracts, the
TBMA/ISMA contract and the European
Master Agreement.
• Some difficulties in the cross-border
management of collateral which can lead
to a preference for deals on domestic
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securities leg of repo trades is not as well
integrated as cash settlement, which can
give rise to some friction in transactions
(see Section II.2 for a discussion of trading,
clearing and settlement issues).
Other factors mentioned include national
peculiarities or investment guidelines limiting
holdings of foreign securities, the different
tax treatment of bonds,7 and the uneven
distribution of collateral throughout the euro
area.
As a consequence of the factors described
above, practices in various repo markets have
not evolved significantly compared with Stage
Two. Furthermore, some peculiarities, such
as the trading of variable rate contracts in
France, continued to be confined to local
markets. A widespread sentiment was that
the introduction of the euro did not prompt
market participants to undertake uniform
changes to the internal organisations with
regard to their repo activity. It can be noted
that some market participants developed
for the first time repo departments, while
banks well established in the repo market
sometimes reorganised their desks. However,
no single model of organisation emerged, as
repo desks were either integrated in cash
management centres, specialised according to
countries, or integrated in bond market
activities.
1.1.2.3 Cross-border transactions
The introduction of the euro led to
a significant increase in cross-border
transactions among euro area countries, in
terms of both volume and market share, as
domestic transactions accounted for only 40%
of the total activity of the largest market
participants in 1999. This trend was especially
noticeable in the unsecured and currency
swap segments of the money market (see
Chart 5 and Table 1). It should be mentioned
that only in the repo market did domestic
transactions increase more rapidly than cross-
border transactions.8
The main factors explaining such
developments include:
• The simplification of cross-border
transactions brought about within the
euro area by the disappearance of the
costs associated with foreign currency
settlement, and the smooth functioning of
TARGET.
• The need to redistribute central bank
money among financial centres.
7 Particularly in Spain, where a drying-up of liquidity takes place
in the 30-day period preceding the government bonds’ coupon
payment.
8 While such a fact seems to be well documented from the data
gathered through the ad hoc ESCB market surveys, there is no
complete information on the borrowing side of money market
activities.
Chart 5
Share of activity in the money market by type of market counterparty
(1999 (Q2) compared with 1998 (Q4))
Source: ESCB market surveys.
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• The development of arbitrage activity by
market participants, as the integration
process enhanced the emergence of a
single money market yield curve. As a
consequence, quotation spreads among the
various euro area countries narrowed very
quickly in the first few months of 1999 to
an average of 2 to 4 basis points, which
represents the minimum price below which
arbitrage is not undertaken. It should be
noted, nevertheless, that larger price
discrepancies occasionally appeared, at the
end of either reserve maintenance periods
or individual days when cross-border
settlement procedures encountered some
problems.
• The emergence of market participants with
a euro area scope of activity, who
broadened their activity to adapt to the
new situation.
1.1.3 Functioning of the market
1.1.3.1 Liquidity, volatility and bid-ask
spreads
According to market participants, liquidity
improved in the unsecured and repo
segments of the money market compared
with the situation prevailing in the former
domestic markets. This was particularly the
case at the short end of the money market
yield curve, mainly as a result of increased
Table 1
Activity in the euro money market: deposit, repo and foreign currency
swap markets as a share of the total
(breakdown by type of market counterparty, 1999 (Q2) compared with 1998 (Q4) (as a percentage))
cross-border transactions in the new
environment.
No systematic comparison of the bid-ask
spreads (i.e. the differentials prevailing in the
market between the bid and the offered
prices) currently prevailing in the euro money
markets and those prevailing before Stage
Three has been performed.9 However,
available indicators on the evolution of bid-
ask spreads confirm the impression of
improved liquidity insofar as there is usually a
positive correlation between both variables.
Some information regarding unsecured
operations may be drawn from intraday data
on the Italian MID (“Mercato Interbancario
di Depositi”), a screen-based market for
interbank deposits: in this market spreads
narrowed, on average, from 3 basis points in
1998 to 1.5 basis points in 1999.10 In the repo
market bid-ask spreads seemed to be either
unchanged (as in the case of France and
Germany) or narrowing to only a few basis
points (in Belgium, Finland, Ireland, Spain and
the United Kingdom).
There is no uniform opinion as regards
interest rate volatility. Market participants’
assessments were conditioned by the
9 See Biais, Hartmann and Manna (2000) for an empirical analysis
of the microstructure of the euro money market. Some of the
main theories can be found in Stoll (1978), Copeland and Galai
(1983), Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and Amihud and
Mendelson (1986). O’Hara (1995) provides a good synthesis of
market microstructure theory.
10 See Annex 3 for more details.
Type of counterparty Money market transactions through
unsecured swaps repos currency swaps
1998 1999 1998 1999 1998 1999
Domestic 68% 48% 42% 43% 23% 15%
Euro area 21% 38% 33% 33% 39% 50%
Other 11% 14% 25% 24% 38% 35%
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different situations prevailing in each country
prior to Stage Three: French banks underlined
the higher level of overnight rate volatility in
Stage Three, whereas Spanish and Italian
banks saw reduced volatility; data from the
MID would confirm reduced volatility in the
first half of 1999 for the Italian market.11
As a rule, contract sizes rose sharply. Only two
exceptions to this rule were reported, namely
Finland, where repo transactions remained
essentially “tailor-made”, i.e. adapted to the
needs of the parties to each transaction as
opposed to the usual standardised approach,
and Portugal. Traders in Germany and France,
for example, reported that contracts in national
currencies were replaced, one for one, with
euro contracts, thus multiplying (by 2 and
6 respectively) the usual value of transactions.
Overnight transactions in the unsecured market
of €500 million to €1 billion are common and
deals over €1 billion are not unusual. On the
repo market contracts for €50 million to
€100 million have become normal and even
deals of €1 billion are not exceptional. Still,
while the market has the capacity to handle
these larger transactions, in order to reduce
settlement risks large deals are often split up
into several transactions.
The evolution of the differential between the
interest rate of the unsecured transactions and
that of the repo transactions, i.e. the “depo/
repo spread”, showed a diverging pattern in the
various euro area countries compared with the
situation in 1998: it declined in Spain, did not
change in Germany and increased in France, the
Netherlands and Italy. In the Netherlands and
Italy spreads often used to be negative in Stage
Two. No clear-cut explanations for these
diverging trends were obtained from market
participants, apart from the fact that repo market
developments are primarily driven by cash in
some countries, while in others they are driven
by the underlying collateral.
However, the cost of managing the collateral
may play a role in explaining the evolution of
the depo/repo spreads. The factors explaining
the relative advantages and costs involved in
the use of collateral for transactions in the
interbank market include the reduction of
risk achieved by the cash lender, the
opportunity cost incurred by the collateral
lender (i.e. cash borrower), and the costs of
managing the collateral borne by both parties
in the transaction, i.e. settlement, marking
to market, coupon treatment, legal
arrangements, etc. These various factors may
have a different importance in different
countries. Spanish banks explained the
reduced depo/repo spreads in Spain by the
relatively low allotments received by them in
the Eurosystem’s refinancing operations, as a
consequence of which the share of available
collateral held by the Banco de España
diminished and, correspondingly, that held by
the market increased. In turn, this situation
boosted the liquidity of the repo market,
thereby contributing to reducing the depo/
repo spread. In other countries, in which cash
lenders were able to include in the price the
cost of managing the collateral, this cost may
have contributed to narrow and even negative
depo/repo spreads. Most market participants
mentioned difficulties in repo settlement as
a factor affecting market prices, particularly
for overnight transactions (Italy and
the Netherlands) and/or in cross-border
transactions (Belgium, France and Finland).12
Moreover, differences in the quality of the
collateral – which is less relevant for the
shortest maturities – and differences in the
settlement of the underlying securities also
play a role in the repo rates hierarchy (see
Section I.3).
Finally, it is worth noting that, according to
the figures provided by market participants,
the share of foreign collateral used for
repo transactions rose significantly in 1999
compared with 1998, from 5% to 23% of the
total. Analogously, an increase in the use of
non-domestic collateral in the Eurosystem’s
refinancing operations was observed in the
course of 1999 in some euro area countries
11 In terms of the daily percentage coefficient of variation, it fell
from1.84 in 1998 to 1.04 in 1999.
12 In Germany some market participants mentioned a smooth
settlement process as one of the reasons behind the development
of the Bunds’ cross-border trading.21 ECB Occasional Paper Series No. 1 • July 2000
(for instance, between 40% and 50% of the
collateral used for the Eurosystem’s credit
operations by French counterparties was non-
domestic).
1.1.3.2 Market participants and the
process of cash management
centralisation
The unification of the euro financial markets
triggered two kinds of developments with
rather opposite effects on the number of
participants in the secured and repo interbank
markets. On the one hand, a wider range of
counterparties emerged, such as German
regional banks and non-euro area participants
(notably from Asia and northern Europe).
These banks, which had previously focused
on their domestic market or on the most
active European markets (notably the DEM
market), tended to extend the scope of their
activities to the whole euro area. On the
other hand, the consolidation and merger
process accelerated, fostering a concentration
of cash management and money market
funding activities in one or two centres. All
in all, major banks seem to have reinforced
their competitive positions, benefiting from a
larger and more liquid market and from an
ongoing process of internal rationalisation.
For their part, small and medium-sized banks,
which were generally less well equipped to
settle cross-border transactions and less able
to obtain credit lines in other euro area
markets, barely changed their business
relationships, remaining mostly confined to
their domestic markets. As a consequence of
these factors, and as a result of differences in
credit ratings, this category of banks has
normally paid a small spread in interbank
transactions. In France, for instance, such
spread was estimated to be between 2 and
3 basis points on average. Thus the general
view is that the segmentation into a “two-
tier” market, which already existed before
the introduction of the euro, was somewhat
reinforced, with large banks active in the euro
money market for cross-border, large-size
deals and ensuring the funding of smaller,
domestically oriented banks.13 These latter
banks, however, were not confronted with a
worsening of funding conditions.
Overall, a concentration has taken place,
which has enhanced the need for more
efficient cross-border transactions. This
fact is a driving force leading to a more
standardised and competitive market. This
move was strongest in the most integrated
segments of the market, such as the interbank
money market and the overnight interest
rate swap (OIS) market, where margins
narrowed significantly, prompting some
participants to discontinue their activity.
To some extent, the trend towards
standardisation and concentration is similar
to the one observed in the foreign exchange
market although, for the time being, the
degree of standardisation has not yet reached
that prevailing in the foreign exchange market.
The possible development of electronic
trading, however, could further boost
standardisation in the money market.
There is a general consensus that the
introduction of the euro triggered a process
of centralisation of funding activities in the
single currency by market participants. Two
different patterns of centralisation may be
distinguished: while some banks centralised
their interbank funding activities in euro at a
single centre (a common pattern among non-
EU banks), other banks maintain subsidiaries
or branches in various euro area countries.
In those cases, payments to be made in other
euro area countries are routed to the
relevant branch. In the latter cases, only the
settlement of the resulting credit or debit
positions among the various branches may
give rise to TARGET transactions. Hence this
type of bank is less dependent on the
functioning of TARGET, and its national
components, than those banks with
centralised cash management.
13 Data from the Italian MID confirm such a tendency: the
participation of members in transactions showed a concentration
in the Herfindahl index growing from 0.58 in the second half of
1998 to 0.65 in the first half of 1999. Concentration in the repo
market might be higher owing to the barriers faced by small
participants in terms of the capacity required to manage the
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Furthermore, the distribution of the activity
of individual branches in the domestic and
non-domestic markets and their bidding
behaviour in the Eurosystem’s refinancing
operations may not be related to their own
liquidity needs, but to the consolidated
position of the group. In this context, banks
face different alternatives as regards their
funding practices and inter-branch fund
allocation:
i) They must choose either intrabank fund
allocation mechanisms or the money market
to redistribute liquidity within their branch
system.
ii) They must decide to which segment
(i.e. unsecured, repo or others) of the money
market to resort. This decision often entails
choosing which branch will trade in the
market. Performing cross-border transactions
through branches, instead of doing it with
other counterparties, may be preferable,
e.g. on the grounds of credit risk
considerations.
The choice between these alternatives is
likely to be driven by risk and cost
considerations.14 On the one hand, banks may
tend to reduce their market activity by
improving their intrabank fund allocation
mechanisms when market conditions are less
attractive, as is often the case on the last
days of the Eurosystem’s reserve maintenance
periods, owing to higher interest rate
volatility and wider spreads. On the other
hand, some market participants pointed out
that, in some cases, banks might refrain from
carrying out cross-border transactions during
the last hours of the day (and perhaps also
on the last days of the reserve maintenance
periods), on account of fears of possible
delays in the settlement process. These kinds
of problems, which also arise in cross-border
fund transfers to or from branches acting on
behalf of the headquarters, might in some
cases reduce branch activity.
In conclusion, while a comprehensive process
of internal reorganisation was undertaken by
euro area banks regarding their treasury
management (and also by non-euro area
banks with regard to their funding activities
in the euro) following the introduction of the
euro, the completion of such a process is still
likely to take some time, not least on account
of the ongoing and future developments in
the field of securities settlement systems. In
the same vein, developments in the field of
electronic trading (through centralised
platforms) were still at an early stage (see
Section III).
1.2 Derivative segments
14 Again, data from the Italian MID may give some indication in
this respect. In the first half of 1999 the share of the Italian
branches of other EMU countries’ banks in total borrowing
activity was significantly lower on the last day of the reserve
maintenance period (22% of the market) than on other days
(31%). No such difference was evident in Stage Two: in the
second half of 1998, both on the last day of the reserve
maintenance period and on other days, the share was steadily
around 40%. It should be noted that the reduced share of
foreign banks’ branches in Italy on the last day of the reserve
maintenance period may also be related to their lower
involvement in tax payments.
Since the start of Stage Three, euro-
denominated money market derivatives have
experienced a process of quick integration
and standardisation, and their depth has
increased substantially. In such context, the
use of FRA instruments (forward rate
agreements) and some other OTC
instruments (“over-the-counter” transactions,
i.e. those carried out in non-organised
markets) diminished in favour of more
standardised products, i.e. swaps and futures.
Owing to the success of exchange-traded
futures, OTC instruments, except interest
rate swaps (IRSs), are now confined to
specific operations, such as structured
products, and their global amount outstanding
has become marginal. By contrast, futures
and swap markets benefited from the
introduction of the euro: the data show an
expansion of more than 60% in the interest
rate swaps market.23 ECB Occasional Paper Series No. 1 • July 2000
1.2.1 Futures markets
Activity in the euro futures markets increased
significantly in the first half of 1999 compared
with the situation prevailing in the markets
for the euro legacy currencies in 1998. Open
positions (i.e. the gross amount of positions
held by market participants) on three-month
futures euro contracts15 increased by 16%
between the end of 1998 and the end of the
first half of 1999. Such a development took
place at the expense of OTC transactions,
which decreased in that period, with the
exception of IRSs.
The EURIBOR three-month futures market
quickly became very liquid and deep, which
was also reflected in tight bid-ask spreads.
This contract inherited the success of the
former “Eurodem” LIFFE contract and
benefited from the greater concentration and
the higher level of activity prevailing in the
money market following the introduction of
the euro. The new contract is traded in the
LIFFE market in London, in the German
Eurex, and in the French Matif. LIFFE
EURIBOR trading is by far the most dominant,
representing more than 80% of the total daily
trading volume. The EURIBOR imposed itself
as a single reference in the cash market, at
the expense of the EURO LIBOR. Therefore,
the EURIBOR contract replaced all former
three-month contracts, i.e. the Eurodem, the
Eurolira, the PIBOR and the MIBOR.
In order to provide an illustration of the
liquidity in the euro short-term futures
markets, Chart 6 shows the ratio between
the volumes traded in three-month euro
contracts in LIFFE, Matif and Eurex, and an
equivalent for the US dollar market, namely
the volumes traded in three-month US dollar
contracts in the two relevant markets: CME
(Chicago Mercantile Exchange) and SGX
(Singapore Exchange). As can be seen, the
liquidity in the euro market is around 50%
that of the US dollar market.
The success of the euro money markets’
futures contracts must be linked to the
standardisation of the euro wholesale
markets and to the harmonisation of the euro
cash market, with the EURIBOR as the main
reference.
Chart 6
Ratio between traded three-month euro futures contracts and three-month
USD futures contracts 1)
Source: Bloomberg.
1) One-month moving average of weekly data. All the usual quarterly future maturities traded on the dates in the x axis have been
considered (starting from March 1999). The USD futures contract figures include data from the CME and SIMEX markets.
15 Including EURIBOR, EURO LIBOR, PIBOR, EURODEM,
EUROLIRA and MIBOR contracts. (See Annex 1 on terminology
for an explanation.)
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1.2.2 Interest rate swap market
The interest rate swap market also
experienced significant changes following the
introduction of the euro. According to data
collected for these surveys, average daily IRS
transactions in the euro area grew by 72%
in 1999 (Q2) compared with 1998 (Q4).
Moreover, all euro area national central banks
noted that the swap market had become
deeper and more liquid as a consequence of
its full unification, and a single yield curve
emerged for the whole euro area. Bid-ask
spreads narrowed and are now set between
1 and 2 basis points. The average transaction
size increased to €50 million, and huge
amounts (such as €5 billion) are not
exceptional. The market appears to be
extremely flexible and standardised. As a
consequence of the growing size of the market,
some smaller market participants might be
considering the possibility of discontinuing their
market-making activity in this area.
The main reasons for the success of the euro
swap market seem to be the following:
• Swaps are now commonly used, instead of
government paper, for hedging positions
in fixed income instruments such as
corporate paper. This is particularly the case
since the start of Stage Three, as a single
swap curve has emerged vis-à-vis a non-
unified government paper curve. In such a
context, the swap curve has become the
benchmark for money market instruments.
• Arbitrage is widely performed on swaps,
thanks to the liquidity, flexibility and depth
of this market.
• High liquidity and depth has attracted more
participants, so the swap market is set in a
“virtuous liquidity circle” “liquidity calls
liquidity”.
• A factor not related to the introduction of
the euro is that market participants are
showing an increasing interest in off-
balance-sheet instruments: the use of
EONIA swaps presents the opportunity to
reduce all short-term interest rate risks to
an overnight basis. Swaps spare capital as
they do not consume large amounts of
credit limits. As a consequence, swaps have
increased at the expense of deposit
markets for funding.
Source: ESCB market surveys.
Table 2
Activity in the interest rate swap market: average daily transactions
Notional amount in EUR millions
1998 1999 Growth as a
Q4 Q2 percentage
1 week 2,153 4,636 115
2 weeks 1,952 4,397 125
1 month 4,276 7,957 86
3 months 4,588 7,906 72
6 months 3,104 4,263 37
9 months 763 1,858 144
1 year 1,144 2,461 115
> 1 year 5,602 7,002 25
Total 23,582 40,480 72
Domestic counterparties 12,438 13,636 10
Euro area counterparties 8,063 21,156 162
Other 3,081 5,688 85
Total 23,582 40,480 7225 ECB Occasional Paper Series No. 1 • July 2000
The introduction of the euro also had an
impact on the characteristics of the swap
market, notably:
• Like other segments of the euro money
market, the swap market became a cross-
border market as the bulk of transactions
became euro area-oriented from the
beginning of 1999 onwards (although
volumes of domestic transactions were
globally stable).
• The bulk of activity in the euro swap
market seems to be concentrated in large
and medium-sized banks. Mainly on
account of the high average size of the
transactions, smaller banks have some
difficulty in entering this market.
• A change in the swap indices used. LIBOR
indices were almost abandoned, as the
“old contracts” were progressively turned
into EURIBOR-based contracts. New
contracts are now referenced mostly with
the six-month EURIBOR and the EONIA.
However, the EONIA represents the
largest part of the euro swap market,
owing to its acceptance as the euro
reference on the interbank market.16
• The average maturity of swap contracts
has decreased slightly since the start of
Stage Three of EMU following a trend
which was also observed in the cash
market: in 1999 61% of swaps (compared
with 54% in 1998) had a maturity of less
than six months. The short-term interest
rate swap segment is therefore the most
liquid, although activity is still substantial
at longer maturities. In particular, swaps
over one year still represent a significant
proportion of the market (17%).
1.3 The market for Treasury bills and other short-term securities
This section discusses developments in the
segments of the money market not dealt with
in the previous section, namely the market
for short-term securities. This market
includes government securities (Treasury
bills) and private securities, i.e. mainly
commercial paper (CP, i.e. short-term
securities issued by corporations) and bank
certificates of deposit (CDs, i.e. short-term
securities issued by banks). The analysis draws
on two sources: the quantitative and
qualitative data gathered through ESCB
market surveys conducted in the context of
the preparation of the studies referred to in
the foreword, and the ECB’s database.
The pace of developments in short-term
securities markets in 1999 was generally slower
than that observed in the other segments of the
money market, even if some significant changes
were also observed. Two main features should
be highlighted. First, compared with the fast
integration observed in the euro unsecured
interbank and interest rate swap markets, the
short-term securities markets remained
relatively fragmented and mostly domestically
oriented. This situation also contrasts, to some
extent, with developments in the euro bond
markets (see Section II). Second, regarding
issuing activity, a changing trend was observed
in the euro area, whereby privately issued
securities overtook the short-term government
paper market. This is discussed further in
Section I.3.1.
As regards the slow degree of integration
observed in short-term securities markets,
several explanations can be provided. For
investors, the rationale for diversifying bond
portfolios is much stronger than for their
holdings of money market instruments.
Financial intermediaries do not usually hold
short-term paper for investment purposes,
but as a secured surrogate for cash. Money
market funds are usually much more
domestically and retail-oriented than bond
funds. As a consequence, the demand for
cross-border investment in short-term
securities tends to be smaller, and this
16 It should be noted that EONIA swaps are settled at maturity
plus one day since the EONIA is not known until 7 p.m. (while
the LIBOR was known at 11 a.m.).ECB Occasional Paper Series No. 1 • July 2000 26
weakens the forces pushing for further
integration.
In addition, infrastructural problems, in
particular the lack of a harmonised trading
environment and the segmentation of clearing
and settlement systems, differences in fiscal
treatment and the lack of uniform legal
documentation, also explain the relatively
slow pace of integration of euro area short-
term securities markets.
I.3.1 Primary markets
In order to provide as complete a picture as
possible of the evolution of developments in
1999, two complementary sources of data are
used in this and the following two sections,
namely a market survey conducted by the ESCB,
and the ECB’s securities database.17
Activity in the primary markets showed a
relatively steady increasing trend in 1999,
although not a very significant one (increasing
by 11.8% as a whole in terms of net issuance).
However, a diverging pattern was observed
between public and private sector issuers:
while the issuance of Treasury bills was
subdued, the issuance of private securities
was relatively steady (see Chart 7). This trend
was reflected in a continuously increasing
share of the participation of private paper in
the global short-term securities market (see
Section I.3.3). During the first half of 1999 a
significant increase in the issuance of both
CP and, especially, CDs was observed; in
relative terms, the share of gross new
issuance by instrument has shifted in favour
of bank CDs (see Chart 7 and Tables 3 to 5).
Several factors explain developments in the
issuance of Treasury bills, CP and bank CDs.
The slowdown in the issuance of public paper
was due to the combination of a reduction in
government deficits in many euro area
countries and Treasuries’ efforts to increase
the average maturity of their liabilities, in
order to take advantage of lower interest
rates. As a result, a reduction in the issuance
of short-term government instruments took
place (-17% overall; during the first half of
1999 sharp declines took place in Belgium,
France, Portugal and Spain), in parallel with
an increase in the issuance of long-term paper.
Chart 7
Gross issuance of euro-denominated short-term securities by issuer sector 1) in 1999
(EUR billions)
Source: ECB.
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central government Monetary Financial Institutions
17 The two sources are complementary since the ad hoc ESCB
market survey provides a non-exhaustive, but rather reliable
comparison of developments in the first half of 1999 with those
in 1998 for individual countries and data on activity in the
secondary market, while the ECB’s database provides a complete
picture for 1999 on a euro area basis. Hence, wherever data for
individual countries are quoted in this section, the source is the
ESCB market survey. The same applies to secondary market
data. In the charts based on the ECB’s database, securities
issued by MFIs (Monetary Financial Institutions) are basically
CDs and those issued by non-financial corporations are essentially
CP. For a description of the ECB’s database see ECB (2000b).27 ECB Occasional Paper Series No. 1 • July 2000
Chart 8
Gross issuance of euro-denominated short-term securities by issuer sector
Source: ESCB market surveys.
Beyond this overall reduction, the supply of
Treasury bills is unevenly distributed among
euro area countries. At the start of Stage
Three, only four markets – the Belgian,
French, Italian and Spanish ones – were
significant and relatively mature, had
substantial amounts outstanding, conducted
regular auctions and had primary dealership
systems. With regard to the German market,
although there are regular quarterly auctions
for “Bubills”, the outstanding volumes and
issuance remain comparably small. This is one
of the factors slowing the development of
the Treasury bill market, given the benchmark
role that German securities play in several
other segments of the euro yield curve. This
also helps to explain why non-residents tend
to stay out of the euro Treasury bills market.
Given the lower issuance of Treasury bills,
institutional investors18 tended to invest
more heavily in CP and bank CDs. In addition,
in a context of decreasing interest rates,
institutional investors sought additional
returns by shifting to longer-term instruments
with higher yields.
As regards the rise in the supply of private
paper, a tentative explanation can be found in
the rebound in economic activity in the euro
area, as reflected in a recovery in investment
expenditure. In addition to the traditional
funding patterns prevailing among European
corporations, i.e. the issuance of long-term
paper and recourse to bank loans, the financial
context created by the single currency fostered
an increased resort to the issuance of CP. In a
context of increased merger and acquisition
operations, CP issuance may have been boosted
further, since such operations were, to some
extent, also financed by resorting to the issuance
of short-term securities. Furthermore, the
attractiveness of the euro market as a whole
and its future prospects encouraged some major
non-resident issuers to enter it and to establish
regular issuing activity. Finally, it should be noted
that these developments have taken place in
the context of a structural movement towards
securitisation and an increased preference for
collateralised lending.
It is important to note that, throughout the
euro area, the supply of bank CDs and CP is
not standardised, as issues are often tailored
to meet the specific needs of domestic
investors (e.g. as in the case of bills with a
specific variable rate). In some countries it
is mostly banks which buy CP. As a
consequence, CP issuance is part of the
business relationship between a corporation
and its bank. Therefore, funding is still globally
intermediated by banks. The very short
maturity of most banks’ CDs and CP is
another consequence of this situation: for
the investment of temporary liquidity
surpluses, CDs and CP appear to be an
alternative to bank deposits.
18 In France the share of CD subscriptions at the beginning of
1999 was as follows: 30% were subscribed by banks, 30% by
corporates, 20% by UCITS (“undertakings for collective
investment in transferable securities”) and 15% by insurance
companies. As regards commercial paper subscriptions, the
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In Belgium, France, Ireland and Spain19 there
were significant increases in bank CD issuance
after the introduction of the euro. Changes
in the fiscal treatment (as in the case of
Spain)20 or in legal regulation (as in the case
of France)21 have made this kind of paper
more attractive to investors.
While the data available on non-resident
participation in the primary market are only
partial, they show that developments in this
regard varied greatly among euro area
countries. In Ireland the issuance of bank CDs
by non-residents in the first half of 1999 was
around 98% of the total, which is explained
by the fact that the two largest issuers are
large international banks. In Italy non-resident
purchases in the primary market for Italian
Treasury bills (BOTs) increased from
€4.1 billion at the end of 1997 to
€27.3 billion at the end of 1998. In Finland,
while in 1998 Treasury bills were sold mainly
to domestic investors, the situation was
reversed in 1999 as most paper was placed
with non-residents. Although there are no
figures available for Germany, there is
regularly a strong non-resident demand for
German “Bubills”.
A comparison of the two periods under
review showed no relevant changes as
regards the usual issuing maturities for short-
term securities. The most common maturities
are three, six and 12 months.22 For Treasury
bills, the 18-month maturity was also used.
Even before the start of Stage Three, short-
term securities were issued almost exclusively
in book-entry form. The issuance of physical
paper is confined to some paper issued in
Finland (CP and municipal debt paper). During
the first few months of 1999 this trend was
enhanced by the fact that, following the
introduction of the single currency, only
securities transferable in book-entry form
became eligible as collateral for the
Eurosystem’s monetary policy operations.
The registration of short-term assets
normally occurs at securities depositories,
both domestic and international. In most
countries there are at least two central
securities depositories for clearing the
different types of securities. The large number
of accounts to be maintained with different
depositories tends to discourage non-
residents from participating in some of the
less liquid markets (see Section III).
1.3.2 Amounts outstanding
As a consequence of the issuing activity
described above, the total amount
outstanding of Treasury bills decreased
substantially (by 17% between the end of 1998
and the end of 1999) and stood at EUR 254
billion at the end of 1999.23 The share of
these instruments decreased to around 44%
of the whole market for short-term
securities, from 55% in the second half of
1998 (see Chart 8). Such a decline was more
than offset by the increase in the amount
outstanding of euro-denominated CDs, CP
and other securities issued by private sector
euro area residents. The amount outstanding
of CDs and other short-term paper issued
by financial institutions grew by 51%, while
that of securities issued by non-financial
corporations (mainly CP) grew by 43%. Still,
at the end of 1999 Treasury bills remained
the most important single segment of the
euro area short-term securities market.
According to data for the first half of 1999,
almost half (44%) of the amount outstanding
consisted of securities issued in Italy. French
and Spanish securities together represented
approximately 32% of the total amount
outstanding, and Belgian securities another
12%. Comparatively small amounts of
19 In Spain bank CDs are referred to as “bank bills”.
20 In Spain there is a favourable fiscal treatment for assets of this
kind issued after 1 January 1999.
21 In France a change in the regulation took effect at the beginning
of 1999. This new legal framework allowed banks to issue
variable CDs directly, and reduced the minimum maturity of
CDs and commercial paper from ten days to one day. Many
credit institutions (around one-third) and a few companies resort
to this new possibility: by mid-1999 issues of less than ten days
represented about 30% of the total amount of CD issues, but
only 1.5% of the outstanding amount.
22 Shorter maturities are also usual, notably in France (see
footnote 15).
23 By comparison, the total amount outstanding of US Treasury
bills reached €649 billion.29 ECB Occasional Paper Series No. 1 • July 2000
Chart 9
Outstanding amounts of euro-denominated short-term securities by issuer sector
(EUR billions)
Note: Values refer to euro-denominated securities other than shares issued by euro area residents.
Treasury bills were outstanding in the other
euro area countries. A reduction in the
amount outstanding was recorded in the first
half of 1999 in most countries (especially in
Spain and Portugal), whereas an increase was
experienced in four countries: Austria,
Belgium, Finland and the Netherlands.
Overall, the figures show an increase in the
amount outstanding of private paper by 41.5%
in 1999 (see Chart 9). Paper issued by non-
financial corporations (mainly CP) grew by
43.2% (from €46.5 billion to €66.6 billion),
while paper issued by Monetary Financial
Institutions (MFIs, mainly CDs) grew by 51.2%
(from €164.9 billion to €248.5 billion).
Available data for individual countries must
be interpreted with particular caution, given
the lack of figures in some countries and the
fact that, in some others, only estimates are
available. At the end of the first half of 1999,
the greatest amount of bank CDs and CP
was concentrated in France (53%), where
both categories of assets recorded a large
increase. Spain and the Netherlands recorded
a substantial increase in the amounts
outstanding of bank CDs, as did Finland for
CP. Nevertheless, these amounts appear to
be small, particularly when compared with
US markets: in the first half of 1999, the
amount outstanding of bank CDs for the
whole of the euro area reached €226 billion,
compared with €977 billion for US CDs,
whereas CP outstanding stood at €86 billion,
compared with €249 billion for the US market.
1.3.3 Secondary markets
The behaviour of investors with regard to
short-term paper tends to restrain the
liquidity of the secondary market. In many
countries (notably France and Spain) the
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major investors in short-term paper are
investment funds (especially money market
funds in France24), which usually tend to keep
most of the paper in their portfolios and are
barely active in the secondary market.
A comparison of secondary market data for
the first half of 1999 and the second half of
1998 (see Tables 3 to 5)25 shows that the
total turnover for Treasury bills declined by
around 5%. Moreover, activity was unevenly
distributed among countries and was
concentrated mainly in France and Belgium
(where it increased by 23%). In most other
countries turnover declined. By contrast, the
turnover of CP increased sharply in the same
period (by 128% as a whole), mainly in
Belgium. The total turnover of bank CDs
declined (by 8%). However, this figure is
somewhat misleading owing to the fact that
the availability of data regarding turnover in
CDs is rather poor. A significant fall in
Finland’s turnover was the cause of the
overall decrease (see Table 4), while the
turnover in the rest of the countries for
which data are available (Belgium, Spain and
France) showed significant increases. In
relative terms, although Treasury bills
continued to be the most traded instrument,
the share of trading in CP increased to 14%,
from 6% in the second half of 1999 (see
Chart 10).
The structural features of the primary market
for bank CDs described above explain the
weakness of the secondary market and the
slow integration of the various markets.
Overall, turnover was moderate, owing to
the limited supply and the fragmented demand
from investors, which is very much focused
on the peculiarities of the different securities.
Some dualism seems to exist between the
retail and wholesale markets. Major investors
in CDs are not active in the secondary
market, as structured bank CD issuance
(e.g. of those CDs linked to a specific index)
is not aimed at market trading, but rather at
Table 3
Activity in the primary and secondary markets for Treasury bills
(EUR billions)
24 The importance of money market funds in France is linked to
the prohibition of the payment of interest on current accounts.
25 Annex 2 provides details on the coverage and methodology of
the ESCB surveys on which Tables 3, 4 and 5 draw. Luxembourg
is not included in Table 3 because the Treasury did not issue
short-term paper in 1998 and 1999.
Source: ESCB market surveys.
1) On 13 April 1999 the Bank of England took over from HM Treasury as the issuer of euro bills with maturity dates from October
1999. The issuance of Bank of England euro bills exactly offsets the reduction in HM Treasury euro bill issuance.
Outstanding Gross new issuances Total turnover
(data at the end of the period) (during the period) (during the period)
2nd half 1st half % of 2nd half 1st half % of 2nd half 1st half % of
of 1998 of 1999 variation of 1998 of 1999 variation of 1998 of 1999 variation
BE 36.7 38.3 4.3 53.0 42.3 -20.3 126.3 154.9 22.6
DE 10.2 9.9 -3.3 10.2 9.9 -3.3 n.a. n.a. n.a.
ES 59.8 51.3 -14.2 27.0 20.3 -24.9 19.2 16.1 -16.4
FR 47.2 46.1 -2.2 72.3 52.3 -27.6 299.9 266.1 -11.3
IE 1.5 1.4 -6.1 4.9 5.5 12.9 0.1 0.1 10.0
IT 137.8 135.0 -2.0 104.7 106.0 1.2 27.2 22.0 -19.1
NL 6.8 11.0 61.4 19.5 34.0 74.3 n.a. n.a. n.a.
AT 4.9 5.8 17.4 0.0 1.9 100.0 n.a. n.a. n.a.
PT 1.9 0.6 -71.3 1.0 0.2 -82.6 0 0.05 2400.0
FI 2.6 3.2 24.2 2.8 2.8 -1.9 12.4 6.3 -49.2
SE 0.0 0.3 100 0.0 0.3 100 n.a. n.a. n.a.
UK 1) 3.5 3.5 0 6.0 6.0 0 6.8 3.4 -49.9
Total 312.9 306.1 -2.2 301.5 281.2 -6.7 492.0 468.9 -4.731 ECB Occasional Paper Series No. 1 • July 2000
Table 4
Activity in the primary and secondary markets for bank certificates of deposit 1)
(EUR billions)
Table 5
Activity in the primary and secondary markets for commercial paper 1)
(EUR billions)
accommodating the needs of specific
investors. Finally, the short average maturity
of the CDs structurally reduces trading
opportunities in the secondary market.
CP issues are largely bought by banks in order
to finance corporations. Weak activity on the
secondary market can therefore be largely
explained by the above-mentioned links
Source: ESCB market surveys.
1) See footnote 25.
2) Italian CDs are not traded.
3) These figures exclude available data from Sweden and Germany respectively in order to obtain representative percentages.
Outstanding Gross new issuances Total turnover
(data at the end of the period) (during the period) (during the period)
2nd half 1st half % of 2nd half 1st half % of 2nd half 1st half % of
of 1998 of 1999 variation of 1998 of 1999 variation of 1998 of 1999 variation
BE 2.8 3.8 32.7 9.3 15.1 62.4 9.9 15.2 52.3
DE 7.3 4.3 -40.5 36.4 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
ES 0.3 2.1 539.2 0.5 7.2 1,430.1 0.7 2.5 234.9
FR 96.8 116.5 20.4 329.0 490.7 49.1 11.7 24.6 109.6
IE 2.5 3.4 34.8 1.3 5.1 292.6 n.a. n.a. n.a.
IT 38.1 32.0 -16.0 n.a. n.a. n.a. 0 2) 0.0 0.0
LU 15.9 16.5 3.6 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
NL 2.8 9.2 234.9 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
FI 18.2 13.6 -25.2 n.a. n.a. n.a. 76.7 48.5 -36.7
SE n.a. 2.4 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
UK 3.7 9.0 143.2 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Total 188.5 210.5 3) 11.7 340.13) 518.1 52.3 99.1 90.7 -8.5
Source: ESCB market surveys.
1) See footnote 25.
2) These figures exclude available data from Sweden and Finland respectively in order to obtain representative percentages.
Outstanding Gross new issuances Total turnover
(data at the end of the period) (during the period) (during the period)
2nd half 1st half %of 2nd half 1st half %of 2nd half 1st half % of
of 1998 of 1999 variation of 1998 of 1999 variation of 1998 of 1999 variation
BE 7.1 8.3 16.4 22.7 28.7 26.4 23.5 65.5 178.8
DE 10.6 11.0 3.6 37.8 36.7 -3 n.a. n.a. n.a.
ES 2.7 3.6 33.5 2.8 3.1 10.3 3.7 4.0 7.1
FR 37.0 47.5 28.6 138.0 191.8 39.0 18.2 28.9 58.9
IE 3.2 5.0 56.0 19.1 7.7 -59.8 n.a. n.a. n.a.
NL 0.7 0.6 -14.7 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
PT 2.2 2.9 30.0 6.8 7.1 4.0 3.0 5.0 66.6
FI 1.6 3.0 81.9 15.6 17.3 11.1 n.a. 5.2 n.a.
SE n.a. 0.1 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
UK 1.2 3.9 229.0 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Total 66.2 85.7 2) 29.3 242.8 292.3 20.4 48.4 103.6 2) 113.6ECB Occasional Paper Series No. 1 • July 2000 32
between corporations and banks (see
Section I.3.2). This pattern could be defined
as pseudo-disintermediation, in the sense that
neither is it traditional bank lending activity
nor does it fit within the usual patterns of
securities issuance, in which banks normally
play a less important role.
Furthermore, owing to the low turnover
prevailing, the pricing of bank CDs and CP is
complicated, as securities are often not
quoted daily. The absence of regular prices
hinders the valuation of portfolios, which, in
turn, discourages investors (particularly
foreign investors) and reduces liquidity.
The share of non-resident investors differs
widely among countries. In Portugal and Spain
outstanding securities (Treasury bills and bank
CDs) are held mainly, if not exclusively, by
residents. In Italy the share of Treasury bills
(BOTs) held by non-residents was around
32%. In that country the opportunity to have
“remote access” to the screen-based MTS
secondary market has been exploited since
1998 by non-resident market participants,
which increased their share from 0.4% in the
second half of 1998 to 12% in the first half of
1999. In the Netherlands the share of non-
residents in the secondary market was
estimated at around 20%.
Chart 10
Shares of total turnover of short-term securities
Source: ESCB market surveys.














Few changes were observed in trading
systems during the period under review.
Although an interest in replacing brokers or
decentralised intermediation with electronic
systems was emerging, the development of
such systems was still at an early stage, partly
owing to the limited trading in these assets,
which tend to be held until maturity.
Brokerage activity continued to be present
and significant in countries such as Finland,
France and Spain.
1.3.4 Microstructure of the market
and liquidity
In the markets for Treasury bills, the first
few months of Stage Three saw the start
of a process of investment diversification
conducted by banks and, to a lesser extent,
by fund managers, aimed at benefiting from
the rate discrepancies prevailing in the various
national markets. As in the process described
above, regarding banks’ activities in the
secured and unsecured interbank markets,
major banks undertook the internal
reorganisation of their trading activities with
the aim of trading both short and long-term
debt on a pan-European basis. In addition, in
most cases major banks are primary dealers
in countries where such a system exists, to
enable them to participate in short-term
Treasury bill auctions. For instance, some
foreign institutions started to bid in Treasury33 ECB Occasional Paper Series No. 1 • July 2000
bill auctions in Italy, trying to exploit the
higher yields of Italian Treasury bills.26 While,
in the case of bonds, market arbitrage activity
is widely developed (see Section I.2), in the
secondary markets for Treasury bills such
activity is hindered by reduced liquidity and
depth.
Market liquidity was poor globally, and bid-
offer spreads were wide, even in countries
with a relatively high turnover.27 This situation
was partly linked to the relative scarcity of
supply resulting from the decreased issuance
of government paper. Additionally, the lack
of liquidity was also due to the fact that
Treasuries’ supply was fragmented, and a
large number of issues were non-fungible
(i.e. issues, the features of which do not allow
them to be treated homogeneously from a
legal and technical point of view). For
instance, in Italy, the largest market for
Treasury bills within the euro area, at the
beginning of July 1999 there were 21 different
lines of BOTs (discount bills) outstanding,
9 lines at a maturity of up to one year for CTZ
(zero coupon securities), and 9 lines with a
maturity of less than one year for CCT
(medium-term notes with annual interest). In
France there were 23 lines of BTF (discount
bills). By comparison, only 32 different lines
existed in the US market for Treasury bills.
Despite the substantial increase in issuance
activity and in the amounts outstanding of
short-term CP and banks’ CDs, in almost all
countries market depth in these sectors
remained considerably lower than that of
Treasury bills. This was partly a result of the
still very limited rating activity in relation to
corporate entities in the euro area, in
particular in comparison with other capital
markets (notably the United States). An
increase in the availability of ratings will help
the financial soundness of such instruments
to be assessed and should therefore boost
institutional investors’ interest in these types
of assets.
With regard to the evolution of the spreads
between Treasury bills and AA-rated CP since
the start of Stage Three, different trends were
26 For a maturity of one year, Italian Treasury bills were issued
around 10 basis points above French and around 5 basis points
above  Spanish Treasury bills. With regard to the three-month
maturity, the prevailing yield differential between French and
Italian issues reached around 30 basis points at a certain point
in time, the Italian paper bearing the highest yield within the
euro area.
27 In France, for instance, bid-offer spreads were wider than in
1998 owing to their relative scarcity, as was illustrated by the
increasing spreads between Treasury bills and swaps (e.g. the
three-month spread between BTF and a swap at a maturity of
three months was above 30 basis points).
observed throughout the euro area. In France
and Germany a widening of the spreads
(i.e. an increase in the positive differential
between the return on private paper and that
on Treasury bills) was observed between
1998 and 1999. In Belgium the spread, which
was initially negative, was reversed. In some
other countries spreads tended to narrow. In
Finland the spread between Treasury bills and
CP oscillated between 0 and 20 basis points
and decreased slightly in the 12 months under
review. In Ireland the spread between
Treasury bills and AA-rated CP narrowed by
around 10 basis points for a maturity of one
month and by 40 to 50 basis points for a
maturity of one year. In Spain spreads decreased
by 10 basis points for a maturity of six months.
In Austria the spreads remained stable.
1.3.5 Changes in the use of short-term
paper as collateral in monetary
policy operations
The proportion of short-term paper,
especially Treasury bills, put forward as
collateral for monetary policy operations
differed widely among countries in the first
half of 1999 compared with the second half
of 1998. In Belgium, Ireland and the
Netherlands the proportion remained stable,
while in most other countries it increased. In
Italy the share of BOTs used as collateral in
reverse transactions with the Banca d’Italia
rose from around 15% in the second half of
1998 to around 30% at the start of Stage
Three (first half of 1999). In some other
countries, such as Portugal and Finland, the
use of short-term securities decreased.
In Portugal the use of Treasury billsECB Occasional Paper Series No. 1 • July 2000 34
for collateralisation in monetary policy
operations declined from 3% to negligible
amounts. In Finland the use of bank CDs
decreased from a maximum of 30% of total
collateral in Stage Two to around 20% in
Stage Three.
It is interesting to note that, in the United
Kingdom, government short-term paper, as
well as other government securities issued
within the euro area and denominated in
euro, became eligible for sterling open market
operations of the Bank of England as from
31 August 1999.35 ECB Occasional Paper Series No. 1 • July 2000
When discussing the impact of the
introduction of the euro on the European
capital markets in general and, in particular,
on the bond market, a first caveat to bear in
mind stems from the difficulties involved in
disentangling the effects of the introduction
of the euro from those of other structural
factors for structural change currently
affecting the financial markets, such as
demographic, technological and regulatory
developments. In addition, in the
European context the effects of the gradual
implementation of the Single Market for
financial services are an important factor in
explaining ongoing changes. In many respects,
the Single Market-related changes interact
with the introduction of the euro in a
mutually reinforcing process.28 A second
caveat stems from the fact that the time
elapsed since the start of Stage Three of EMU
is too short for any observation of structural
change to be done properly, in particular
on account of the difficulties involved in
distinguishing short-lived factors affecting
market developments and one-off effects
of the introduction of the euro from the
structural changes which can be expected to
remain as a consequence of the new context
brought about by the creation of the single
currency. While the latter caveat also holds
true for the money market developments
discussed above, the relatively smaller
proximity of the bond market to the
immediate impact of the single monetary
policy implies that changes in the bond market
can be expected to be somewhat slower than
those in the money market, and also that
more caution is warranted when linking them
to the introduction of the euro.
A description of the main effects that the
introduction of the euro might have been
expected to have a priori in the bond market
can be used as a tentative benchmark against
which the developments observed since the
introduction of the euro can be appraised.
A first grouping of the effects which might
have been expected would include two main
concepts: first, the appearance of economies
of scale stemming from the disappearance of
II The euro bond market
currency and other related barriers; this
should be reflected, in particular, in an
increased investor base and an increased
universe of potential issuers and, second, an
increased homogenisation of practices both
on the supply side (in the form of innovative
competition with regard to issuing techniques
and some aspects of secondary market
organisation) and on the demand side
(affecting the degree of diversification within
the euro area). Some more specific effects
linked, to a varying extent, to the two
effects broadly described above include a
greatly increased diversification of investors’
portfolios within the euro area, an increase
in the number of market participants (issuers)
and in the average size of individual issues,
increased relative incentives for the issuance
of bonds (in fact, of securities in general)
compared with bank borrowing, which should
lead to a process of securitisation, enhanced
opportunities for access to the capital
markets by new sectors of the economy
formerly absent from it (in particular small
and medium-sized enterprises and high-
growth corporations), improved secondary
market liquidity and more efficient price
formation. Virtuous interaction among
many of the above-mentioned factors could
ultimately be expected to bring about a
reduction in the costs of financing, although
no attempt is made here to analyse such a
development.
Bearing in mind the caveats mentioned above
and also the scope of the issues addressed in
this Paper, the evidence reflected in this section
provides indications that, only a year after the
introduction of the euro, there were a number
of signs of major changes in the European bond
market.29 In such a short period the European
28 Some reviews of the implications of EMU for capital markets
are Dermine and Hillion (1999), Gros and Lanoo (2000), Bishop
(1999), Danthine, Giavazzi and von Thadden (2000), Gros
(1998), McCauley and White (1997), Mayer (1999) and Prati
and Schinasi (1997). Recent, general discussions on financial
systems can be found in Allen and Gale (2000), Demirguc-Kunt
and Levine (1999) and Levine (2000). This broader issue is not
addressed in this Paper. ECB (2000a) contains a review of
developments during the first year of EMU.
29 In this context references to the European bond market must be
understood as references to the euro-denominated bond market,
even if some of the issues discussed may also have affected
other European bond markets.ECB Occasional Paper Series No. 1 • July 2000 36
bond market became significantly larger and
more integrated; in particular, the sovereign
segment of the market became more
homogeneous and signs of increased integration
were perceived in other segments; private
issuers’ activity overtook that of sovereign
issuers, which had traditionally dominated the
bond market, and signs of innovative
competition were observed with regard to
issuing techniques. Likewise, in a context of
increased competition among issuers, substantial
efforts were made to try to improve liquidity
conditions and, thereby, the attractiveness of
individual issues for a much broader investor
base. As a result of such developments, signs of
improved liquidity were also perceived. With
regard to international bond issuance, during its
first year of existence the euro slightly overtook
the US dollar as the denomination currency.30
Overall, the euro area bond market is starting
to become an important source of finance
for the private sector and, in particular,
for corporations, thus complementing the
increasing role of the short-term securities
market in this same respect. A larger number
of firms have access to the market owing to
the increased willingness of investors to buy
paper with lower ratings, while innovations
in issuing and trading are improving liquidity.
As regards the technical aspects of the
transition to EMU, such as the re-
denomination and re-conventioning of bonds
denominated in the euro legacy currencies
into euro-denominated bonds, it worked
smoothly and was hardly seen as an issue by
market participants.31
This section analyses the major changes which
occurred in the euro bond markets in 1999. It
is based on the analysis of several data sources,
as well as on an ESCB market survey, which
was mainly of a qualitative nature, on the
changes brought about by the introduction of
the euro.32 While it is difficult to make a
distinction between those changes which were
mainly demand-driven and those which were
primarily supply-driven, for methodological
reasons the description provided below starts
with a discussion of developments affecting
investors’ demand and follows with a
discussion from a supply-side perspective.
Thereafter developments in secondary markets,
in derivatives markets and those affecting market
participants are briefly addressed.
30 See Detcken and Hartmann (2000) for a discussion on the
international role of the euro and, in particular, its role as the
denominator of securities.
31 The only exception to such rule are the few remaining issues
denominated in euro legacy currencies, for which liquidity decreased.
32 See Annex 2 for more details.
33 See French and Poterba (1991) and Tesar and Werner (1992);
for a discussion of the effects of EMU on portfolio management,
see Brookes (1999).
34 The source on which the discussion is based here is the qualitative
information obtained through the ESCB market survey described
in Annex 2. The coverage of the survey was broad enough to
ensure that the answers did indeed reflect the bulk of ongoing
developments. While not precise in quantitative terms (in some
cases some estimates were provided by institutional investors),
the survey clearly indicated that the diversifcation process
prompted by the introduction of the euro was very significant.
II.I The demand side: developments in investment behaviour
Traditionally, fixed income European
investors have shown a strong home bias,
i.e. a tendency to keep international
diversification below optimal levels, a pattern
also found at a more general, global level.
Such behaviour constitutes the so-called
home-bias puzzle and has never been
explained, from a theoretical point of view,
in a fully satisfactory way, in the sense that
the magnitude of such a bias seems to reflect
a departure from economic rationality on the
part of investors.33 The discussion here
focuses on the European experience since
the start of EMU with regard to both
geographical diversification and diversification
into new financial instruments, which is also
partly related to EMU. The lack of data on
portfolio diversification, however, does not
allow any quantitative estimate to be provided
on the degree of diversification reached so
far. Yet, with the caveats derived from
the lack of quantitative information,34 the
evidence reflected in this chapter could be
interpreted as an indication of the relevance
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rate risk and others) to diversification: the
removal of the exchange rate risk within the
euro area together with other associated
institutional changes were reflected in an
intensive diversification process during the
first year of EMU.35 The “frictional costs”
and information imperfections are at the core
of the explanations traditionally invoked for
the investors’ home bias. More specifically,
relevant factors might include the existence
of legal and institutional impediments to
international diversification, such as currency
matching rules (i.e. rules limiting the
currency risk exposure incurred by investors),
familiarity with the domestic market, a heavy
reliance on domestic counterparties and
insufficient expertise for large-scale, cross-
border investments, or existing accounting
conventions (see Section II.1.1.5).
Since the mid-1990s a tendency to diversify
and internationalise has been observed among
European institutional investors. To some
extent such a tendency was also observed in
non-European countries, in the wake of
generalised financial liberalisation since the
1980s. Prior to Stage Three of EMU fixed
income funds’ managers tried to exploit
intra-European interest rate differentials and
exchange rate fluctuations.36 However, the
portfolio diversification resulting from EMU-
related flows was still limited and was largely
confined to government bonds.
It was only after the final decision on the
adoption of the single currency, in mid-1998,
that intra-European currency risk ceased
to affect transactions among currencies
prospectively merging into the euro. From
that moment, a clear trend towards the
geographical diversification of institutional
portfolios into assets issued in prospective
euro area countries was observed. As a
consequence, yields experienced a quick
and substantial convergence. While the
diversification process under way in the
euro area is primarily geographical, it is also
affecting the distribution of investment among
the various asset classes. A clear shift from
government bonds into all sorts of “credits”
(i.e. securities other than government bonds,
such as corporate bonds), asset-backed
and mortgage-backed securities such as
Pfandbriefe (i.e. German mortgage bonds),
structured products and even “junk” (high-
yield) bonds is being observed.
The ongoing portfolio diversification in the
euro area is discussed in this section,
focusing on the geographical diversification
of government bond portfolios, the shift
into new asset classes and the change in
benchmark indices. Remaining impediments
to diversification are also briefly described.
II.1.1 Investment diversification
II.1.1.1 Geographical diversification within the
euro area
Following the removal of the exchange rate
barrier within the euro area, in the course of
1999 the strategic focus of investors
shifted and this brought about a substantial
reallocation of portfolios. However, the
impression was that the diversification
process prompted by the introduction of the
euro was far from complete after the first
year of Monetary Union. With regard to the
diversification of investment in government
bonds, a factor which may have slowed the
process somewhat is the limited incentive for
diversification implied by the reduction in
the spreads among the various euro area
government bonds. As a consequence,
and considering transaction costs, some
investors seem to have followed a pattern of
“passive diversification”, confining it to the
reinvestment of coupons, redemptions and
new cash flows.
35 The adequacy of the term “diversification” in this context could
be challenged on the grounds that the exchange rate risk faced
by euro area investors has ceased to exist for euro-denominated
financial transactions, and cross-border investment should just
be referred to as such. However, the usual terminology is
preferred here since “diversification” may refer to factors other
than the currency denomination.
36 In particular, the “convergence plays” among EU countries’
government bonds, i.e. market transactions induced by
expectations related to the prospects for accession of individual
EU countries to EMU, became common in the years prior to
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As a rule, institutional investors in smaller
countries diversified more quickly than did
investors in larger countries, mainly
because the incentives for diversification are
potentially bigger for investors with a
relatively reduced choice of domestic assets.
On the other hand, the fact that, since the
start of EMU, liquidity has become the main
differentiating feature among government
bonds, together with credit risk, has put
larger countries in a privileged position as
recipients of investment reallocated in the
wake of EMU (see Box 1). In some cases, the
limited liquidity prevailing in the smaller
government debt markets was not offset by
the yield differentials. As a consequence,
many investors tended to concentrate their
holdings in larger and more liquid euro area
government bond markets.37
Box 1
Liquidity premia and specialness of government bonds
When looking at the European government bond market, spread variations along the yield curves can be
explained by one major factor besides the difference in creditworthiness: liquidity. The most common
definition of “liquidity” refers to the extent to which market participants are able to conduct sufficiently large
transactions without producing major price movements, and tends to be reflected in tight bid-offer spreads and
the absence of price gapping. In the bond market, the liquidity of issues depends on matters such as issue size,
age (recent issues tend to be more actively traded) and secondary market making commitments. In any case,
liquidity is to a large extent a “self-fulfilling process”. This is because certain bonds are liquid as a result of the
market expectation of their being liquid, which attracts buyers and sellers, minimises transaction costs and
generates high turnover.
Liquidity enables traders and investors to manage portfolios actively or to hedge positions at the lowest
possible cost. The market preference for liquidity can be priced and translates into a liquidity premium for
liquid bonds, i.e. investors accept a lower yield when investing in a liquid instrument. Volatility and market
expectations tend to drive liquidity preferences.
Another factor that can cause bonds to be expensive is their deliverability into futures contracts. CTDs
(cheapest to deliver in a futures contract) in particular can have significantly lower yields in relation to the
yield curve. Normally, this tends to be reflected in the repo market: market participants are willing to lend
money at lower than money market rates if they receive the CTD bond as collateral. In this case the bond is
said to be “special in repo”. Repo specialness is not necessarily confined to CTDs. Other bonds that trade at a
premium, such as non-CTD deliverables and recent liquid bonds which traders can sell short in order to hedge
positions, can be special in repo. The repo market, therefore, can be seen as a link between liquid and less
liquid bonds.
The importance of liquidity as a driver of yield differentials in government bond markets is partly the
consequence of the integration of these markets, but more temporary factors, such as the 1998 liquidity crisis
and Year 2000 considerations, can also occasionally play a role. Furthermore, as investors diversify into other
(usually less liquid) credit classes, while overall wanting to maintain a reasonably liquid portfolio, the
liquidity preference translates disproportionately into the government bond markets.
Looking forward, it is expected that liquidity will gain greater importance as the main driver of yield
differentials in the euro area. Indeed, it is thought that the euro area bond market will increasingly resemble
the US Treasury market, with a clear difference between on-the-run and off-the-run bonds. In explaining yield
differences on the euro area yield curve, liquidity, benchmark and CTD premia are already more important
than credit risk.
37 From the technical standpoint, i.e. that of the benchmark
indices used by portfolio managers, such an approach is
facilitated given the degree of freedom around the benchmarks
(measured in terms of tracking error) and the high correlations
between euro area government bonds (see Section II.1.1.5 and
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As regards diversification into corporate
bonds, this seemed to be somewhat slowed
by the costs associated with credit risk
analysis and by the need on the part of
investors to reconsider their strategies. In
particular, the size of small and medium-sized
investors’ portfolios may not be sufficient
to compensate for the costs of internal
credit risk management (i.e. hiring and
training credit specialists and implementing
technology). As a consequence, many have
chosen to participate in institutional credit
funds (often offered by the larger investors).
The persistence of liquidity and credit
differences among sovereign bonds in the
euro area results in a non-unique government
bond yield curve. In this respect, the
European bond market still differs from fully
integrated markets. German and French
bonds are broadly seen by market participants
as the main components of the yield curve
for euro-denominated bonds. German bonds
are seen as the benchmark for the two-year
and ten-year sectors of the curve, while
French bonds are considered to be the
benchmark for the intermediate sector and
for maturities of over ten years.38
II.1.1.2 Diversification into other asset classes
While the introduction of the euro
broadened the concept of “domestic” market
faced by individual euro area investors, it
also forced portfolio managers to change
their asset allocation strategies. In order to
outperform their benchmarks, for investment
within the euro area, portfolio managers must
now essentially focus on the management of
credit risk and yield curve risk (i.e. the risk
linked to the positioning through the
various segments of the yield curve). Such
developments, together with the low interest
rates and the tight spreads for triple A and
agency bonds (i.e. bonds issued by
public institutions other than central
government) prevailing at the start of EMU,
prompted investors to diversify into a wider
range of corporate bonds, encompassing
relatively low-rated bonds. While the demand
for AA and A-rated bonds grew substantially
in 1999 (reflected in issuance growth of
around 100% compared with 1998), the
Chart 11
Increase in euro area issuance: breakdown by issuer rating
(percentage increase in issuance in 1999 compared with the 1996-98 average)
Source: Capital Data Bondware, 2000. Includes all international and domestic issues, apart from auctioned domestic government
debt.
Note: Data up to 1998 refer to euro legacy currencies and ECU-denominated issues; in 1999, euro-denominated issues. All issue
amounts are provided in USD millions in order to give consistent comparisons.
38 The heterogeneous fiscal treatment of the various bonds also
creates difficulties. Some price distortions are reported as being
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Chart 12
EMU-11 bond issuance 1996-99 in euro, by rating
(USD millions)
Source: Capital Data Bondware, 2000.
Note: Data up to 1998 refer to euro legacy currencies and ECU-denominated issues; in 1999, euro-denominated issues. All issue
amounts are provided in USD millions in order to give consistent comparisons.
issuance of Baa-rated bonds grew by much
more (around 500% during the year, see
Charts 11 and 12 and the next section on
issuing activity), albeit from very low levels.
Decisions to resort to diversification along
the maturity spectrum were also observed.
The development of new investment
strategies along the lines described above
also had consequences for the internal
organisation of investors. Many of them have
reinforced, or have initiated, credit research.
Some of them have decided to outsource the
management of credit risk, confining their
in-house operations to interest rate risk
management.
II.1.1.3 Changes in the use of indices
The process of strategic repositioning of
investment portfolios in the wake of the
introduction of the euro has clearly been
reflected in the change in the indices that
investors use as a benchmark (see Box 2). By
the beginning of 1999 most investors in the
euro area had replaced the widely used
national bond market indices with European
indices. However, both the speed of
implementation of the new benchmarks and
the way in which they were constructed differ
greatly.
The concept of a “euro benchmark” is usually
understood by investors in a broad sense. In
such a context, “Europe” is often not seen as
being a synonym for the euro area, and
wider definitions including EU non-euro area
countries (Greece, Denmark, Sweden and
the United Kingdom) and sometimes other
countries (i.e. EU accession countries) are
common. Moreover, not all investors
follow the standard indices; most of them
adjust the indices to accommodate
individual preferences. Some investors feel
uncomfortable with indices which are too
wide, as they prove to be difficult to replicate
and track. In such cases the benchmarks can
have a strong home bias or be based on the
national indices of the larger EU countries.
II.1.1.4 Remaining impediments to diversification
and integration
Despite the substantial progress observed
during the first year of EMU, the integration
of the European capital markets is far from
complete. While the integration process and
the increased diversification trend are, in any
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Box 2
Index use
In order to assess returns on investments, investors, portfolio managers and risk managers must take into
account the risks incurred. For a bond market investment, such risks include interest rate risk, credit risk,
liquidity risk and – for an international portfolio – currency risk. Both investment decisions and performance
evaluations are usually seen in the light of the risk taken on. Therefore, some neutral yardstick, or benchmark,
able to reflect strategic investment decisions is required. This is the role of indices.
An index is a hypothetical portfolio of securities that closely matches the risks an investor accepts or is willing
to take. The degree of freedom for the actual management of the portfolio is usually defined in terms of
“tracking error” (a measure of the maximum allowed deviation of the value of the portfolio) vis-à-vis the
benchmark portfolio. To be useful as a benchmark, an index must be well diversified over all the relevant risk
factors. Moreover, the index should consist of sufficiently liquid bonds in order to enable a performance
evaluation frequently marked-to-market (i.e. adjusted to market prices).
Traditionally, the American investment banks have dominated the production of bond indices. Since the start
of EMU, constructing a good index for a European bond portfolio including “credits” has been a major
challenge given the temporary gap existing between an increased demand for diversification and a still limited
supply of corporate bonds. The completeness of the index (i.e. the width of its coverage of various asset
classes) has to be balanced against its liquidity (which, given the still limited development of the euro area
secondary bond markets, can be very limited in some asset classes, thus causing the index to be less useful as a
pricing reference if these are included).
event, structural processes which are likely
to take time, the existence of institutional or
legal barriers to them within the euro area is
also a factor behind its relative slowness. In
this regard, the following factors are the most
relevant:
• With regard to the legal impediments, the
lack of clarity and uniformity in bankruptcy
laws is often mentioned, which, in
particular, might hinder diversification into
the high-yield bond market.
• Certain tax regulations have to be taken
into account in considering further
internationalisation. Withholding tax is
mentioned most frequently in this respect.
• Accounting conventions: integration can be
slowed down by the accounting treatment
of institutional investors’ profits; in a low-
yield environment diversification would
require investors to sell above par bonds,
thereby boosting accounting profits for
some insurance companies (and bringing
taxes forward). While the incidence
of such a factor depends on market
circumstances, it is seen as an additional
reason for investors to take a gradual
approach towards investment in foreign
bonds.
• Fragmentation of European settlement
systems is seen as a factor limiting
integration and portfolio diversification,
even though it affects trading more than
institutional investment (see Section III).
Overall, the trend of increased
internationalisation and diversification of
portfolios in the euro area is expected to
continue. First, it is likely that remaining
impediments will gradually be overcome.
Second, in the current low-yield environment
and in the absence of exchange rate risk within
the euro area, investors are willing to invest in
instruments with a higher risk and return and
this greater demand should increasingly be met
by the corporate sector in the coming years,
also on account of the expected decrease inECB Occasional Paper Series No. 1 • July 2000 42
government debt issuance (see Section II.2).
Finally, the need for European savers to prepare
for their increasing future pension needs will
also contribute to boosting securities demand
Chart 13
Bond issuance in 1996-99 in euro and euro legacy currencies
(USD billions)
Source: Capital Data Bondware, 1999. It includes all international and domestic issues apart from auctioned domestic government
debt.
Note: Data up to 1998 refer to euro legacy currencies and ECU-denominated issues; in 1999, euro-denominated issues. All issue
amounts are provided in USD millions in order to give consistent comparisons with previous years.
39 Data in charts 13, 16 and 17 are taken from Capital Data
Bondware, and when analysing them it should be kept in mind
that they do not include the bulk of government bonds, which
form the major part of the euro area bond market (around
60%). The rate of issuance growth in 1998 was bigger than that
in 1999, as reflected in Chart 13. However, the  major increase
took place in 1999 as regards corporate issuance (269% growth
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in the euro area. Nevertheless, even taking all
these factors into account, it might take years
for the corporate capital market in Europe to
be comparable with its US equivalent.
II.2  The supply side: developments affecting issuer behaviour
The integration of national capital markets
has significantly increased the competition
among issuers. Owing to the shift, as
illustrated above, in investors’ focus from
their respective national bond markets to a
wider range of bonds, both sovereign and
private issuers – in particular smaller ones –
have to focus on a broader investor base
when defining their strategies. At the same
time, they are increasingly competing with
one another. While in some respects the
forces for change and increased competition
are common to both the government and the
corporate bond segments, their starting-point
was rather different: whereas the national
government bond markets were already
rather developed prior to EMU, European
corporate bond markets were largely
underdeveloped. The main trends observed
in the structure of supply in the euro area
bond markets are described below.
All in all, the impact of EMU on the euro area
bond market on both the demand side (as
discussed above) and the supply side (as discussed
below) was reflected in a substantial increase in
the total issuance of euro-denominated bonds,
which grew by 38%, and in particular of corporate
bonds (see Charts 13 and 16).39
II.2.1 Government bonds
In general, sovereign bond issuers in the
euro area have benefited from the ongoing
integration of national capital markets.43 ECB Occasional Paper Series No. 1 • July 2000
Following the introduction of the euro,
currency-related risk premia have vanished
and, as a result, funding costs have been
reduced, albeit to a varying extent, for the
various euro area sovereign issuers. Yield
differentials among the euro area government
bonds have converged markedly since the
May 1998 pre-announcement of the
irrevocable fixing of the parities of the
prospective euro area currencies. Since then,
they have usually remained below 30 basis
points, whereas in the past spreads in excess
of 100 basis points had been common.
Furthermore, the prospect of a relative
scarcity of government bonds – as a result of
the Stability and Growth Pact and the related
decrease in overall supply and the likely
increase in corporate issuance – contributed
to driving government bond yields down in
relation to other asset classes, thereby further
reducing funding costs for governments.
The fact that, since the start of Monetary
Union, the various euro area national
Treasuries have to a large extent been
competing to access a common investor base
has been reflected in the introduction of a
number of changes in their issuing frameworks,
in order for them to be able to cope with the
new situation and, ultimately, attract funds in
the best possible conditions. As mentioned in
the previous section, investors increasingly
focus on liquidity, and competition for the
benchmark status has become increasingly
important. This context has mostly benefited
the larger sovereign issuers. As a consequence,
the pressure for increased competitiveness
has increased for smaller issuers. In this
context of increased competition, a significant
harmonisation of issuing practices has
emerged, leading to convergence in the
direction of best practices. The main changes
observed in sovereign issuing practices since
the start of Monetary Union can be summarised
as follows:40
• Issue sizes have become bigger. A nominal
amount of €5 billion per issue seems to
be a minimum and benchmark issues tend
to be tapped until their total issue size is
around €20 billion.
• Sovereign issuers focus increasingly
on a policy aimed at creating discrete
benchmark issues, especially in cases where
the total amount of government debt is
too small to ensure sufficient liquidity
through the whole yield curve. The focus
is usually on specific market segments,
i.e. a pre-commitment to issue only large
liquid issues at, for example, three,
ten and 30-year maturities. The most
prominent example of a benchmark policy
within the euro area is Ireland, which has
totally restructured its outstanding debt
into a few liquid benchmark issues.
Other countries, such as Spain and
the Netherlands, have also introduced
programmes to exchange old illiquid bonds
for new benchmark bonds.
• Generally, sovereign issuers have improved
market transparency. Efforts in this area
include a trend towards the introduction
of pre-announced auction calendars with a
varying degree of detail and commitment.
• A number of governments have also
changed their issuance procedures in order
to attract more investors. There is a clear
trend towards an increased use of primary
dealers (see Box 3), although some of the
smaller issuers have also resorted to
syndication procedures in order to reach
a larger set of investors.
• Governments are also trying to to find
ways in which to enhance the secondary
market liquidity of their bonds other
than through primary dealerships. Most
important in this respect is the promotion
of new liquidity-enhancing technology.
Some governments have been very keen
to see the establishment of trading systems
such as EuroMTS (see Section III) and
the introduction of their bonds in these
systems. While such initiatives can be
expected to increase liquidity, available
40 For a discussion of the effects of EMU on sovereign issuers see
Favero, Missale and Piga (2000). Bishop (1999-2000) provides
a complete discussion of bond market developments in the euro
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indicators of secondary market activity in
the first half of 1999 do not generally show
a significant change compared with the
second half of 1998; in some countries
turnover increased slightly, while in others
it seems to have diminished somewhat; no
clear modifications seem to be in place
regarding bid-ask spreads. The standard
deal size seems, however, to have grown
in a number of cases.
• Finally, governments can try to focus on
particular investor needs in order to carve
out a market niche by concentrating
on innovation. The French and Spanish
Treasuries seem to have been those
initially most active in this field, by
providing the market with constant
maturity and inflation protected
alternatives in addition to their ordinary
bonds.41
The amount outstanding of government bonds
increased slightly in the course of 1999, in spite
of decreasing gross issuance during the year.
The decreased issuance in 1999 (see Chart 14)
was the result of a number of factors, notably,
on the one hand, the reduced borrowing needs
caused by the globally improved fiscal situation
41 Constant maturity bonds have a coupon that is periodically reset
to the prevailing ten-year bond yield, for example.
Box 3
Primary dealership
Primary dealership systems for government bonds currently exist, in several varieties, in all the euro area
countries, with the exception of Luxembourg. In most of these countries primary dealers have been in place
for many years, their creation usually being associated with the modernisation of the local financial market
structures and debt issuance procedures. Only in the Netherlands was a system of primary dealers introduced
in order to address specifically the changes triggered by the euro.
The reason for establishing a primary dealership system or for updating an existing one can be twofold.
Sovereign governments want to secure a smooth and diversified placement of their debt. As a consequence,
special emphasis has been placed on the internationalisation of this placement. This movement has taken two
different forms: on the one hand, some issuers have opened their primary dealership system to non-resident
intermediaries, putting them on an equal footing with domestic participants. On the other hand, countries such
as France and Belgium have created, in addition to the status of primary dealer, a specific group of market
participants devoted to promoting the sale of public debt on foreign markets.
Primary dealerships usually entail market-making commitments for banks in the group. Sovereign issuers
make use of these provisions to enhance secondary market liquidity.
Even if they are based on a similar philosophy, the various primary dealership schemes appear to be quite
different in their practicalities. For instance, in Germany the commitments of the members of the “Bund Issues
Auction Group”, which replaced the former Federal Bond Consortium at the beginning of 1998, refer only to
an adequate participation in the auction, while in most other countries this commitment is complemented by
some benefits (a monopoly on stripping activity, for instance, in France, the Netherlands, Belgium and Spain)
and requirements on the secondary market (quotations for clients, and market-making for other intermediaries
in France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Spain, Portugal, Finland, Italy and Ireland).
The extent to which a primary dealership system contributes to bond market integration depends largely on the
composition of the group of dealers. In this respect, the trend is towards wider international representation.
Too much emphasis on domestic houses might be perceived by the market as being a protectionist measure
rather than with an attempt to reach a wider investor base.45 ECB Occasional Paper Series No. 1 • July 2000
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and, on the other, an increased preference for
longer maturities, in a context of low long-term
interest rates, which was also reflected in the
reduced issuance of Treasury bills, as discussed
above. In addition, some concentration of
issuance in the first few months of the year
(“frontloading”) was observed, which can be
explained by the competition between sovereign
issuers for benchmark status during the first
few months of Monetary Union. All in all, the
size of the euro area government bond market
increased slightly in the course of 1999 (see
Chart 15).
Issuance by non-euro area sovereign issuers
in the euro bond market was limited in
1999, as swapping the proceeds into domestic
currency was not attractive at the prevailing
swap levels.
II.2.2 Supranational and government
agency issues
Supranational issuers had traditionally
enjoyed a privileged position in Europe prior
to EMU owing to the combination of their
size and their high rating, which allowed them
to offer a constant (i.e. equal credit quality)
benchmark across different currency bond
markets. The improvements in the situation
faced by other highly rated euro area issuers
(sovereign or corporate ones), as brought
about by the changes in investor behaviour
described above, have been reflected in a
worsening, in relative terms, of the situation
faced by supranational issuers, which now
face increased competition. Like sovereign
borrowers, since the start of EMU
supranational issuers have therefore been
trying to make their bonds more attractive
by increasing the issue sizes, providing
benchmarks and enhancing secondary market
liquidity. Despite such efforts, supranational
issuers seem to have lost some ground in the
European bond markets during the first year
of Monetary Union. Issuance targets were
increasingly hard to meet at the terms
supranationals had been accustomed to and
their bonds tended to trade at higher yields
in the secondary markets. As a consequence,
total euro-denominated issuance during the
year stood 35% lower than the average of
the previous three years (see Chart 16).ECB Occasional Paper Series No. 1 • July 2000 46
The impact of the introduction of the euro
on securities issuers such as government
agencies and local governments during the
first year was not unambiguous. On the one
hand, like other euro area issuers, such
institutions enjoyed a wider investor base;
on the other, they faced increased
competition between one another and with
sovereign issuers. Such competition may not
be easy for such institutions in terms of the
size of issues. However, they also tried to
improve liquidity conditions by means of
larger issues. All in all, global issuance during
the year was similar to that in the previous
three years (see Chart 16).
II.2.3 Corporate bonds
Although the amount outstanding of privately
issued bonds in the euro area is still relatively
modest compared with that in the United
States, the issuance of corporate bonds
increased markedly in 1999 (see Chart 16). A
number of mutually reinforcing factors, both
demand and supply-driven, were behind this
development. The former have already been
discussed above; on the supply side the
following could be mentioned:
• As a consequence of the further
development of European capital markets,
corporations – those with a good credit
rating, in particular – have increasingly
been exploring the opportunities for direct
financing, looking for better funding
conditions. This was facilitated, in some
cases, by the fact that the credit ratings of
a number of corporate issuers are better
than those of their banks.
• Increased financing needs also seem to
have been a factor in the growth of
corporate issuance. To a large extent, in
1999 these were related to an intensive
process of consolidation under way in the
European corporate sector, partly as a
consequence of EMU. Increased merger
and acquisition activity usually coincides
with increased financing needs.
Chart 15
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• The context of EMU-related increased
competition in the European business
sector seems to have prompted corporate
managers to focus more on their
financial structure and optimal financial
leverage, which might have reinforced the
disintermediation trend highlighted above.
• Corporate issuance tends to be facilitated
by banks. The increased focus on
shareholder value by corporate managers,
new BIS regulations on bank capital, and
stronger competition in the European
financial sector prompted banks to use
their balance sheets more efficiently, in
order to increase their return on
equity. As a consequence, banks are
increasingly facilitating direct access by
corporations to the capital markets
(i.e. by lead-managing bond issues). This
disintermediation trend was also reflected
in the substantially increased issuance
programmes of financial institutions (see
Chart 16).42
• The new dimension of the market was also
reflected in the fact that the average size
Chart 16
Euro-denominated issuance by issuers other than central governments in euro and
euro legacy currencies; global, domestic or foreign markets; volume of gross issuance
(USD billions)
of corporate issues approximately doubled
in the euro area in 1999 compared with
the previous three years (see Chart 17).
During 1999 the amount outstanding of euro-
denominated bonds issued by non-euro area
residents grew by 39%, while that issued by
euro area residents grew by 8% according to
ECB data.43
Despite the significant growth observed in
the euro area bond market during 1999, it
should be noted that some market segments
remain underdeveloped, particularly those
for lower credit rated and unrated debt.
Relatively few euro area corporations have a
credit rating, and this is a factor currently
restricting their access to the bond market.
Market participants foresee that corporates
42 An in-depth analysis of such a trend, however, which is not
intended here, should compare these developments with trends
in bank lending activity, which also showed rapid growth in 1999
and early 2000.
43 See Molinas and Woodworth (2000) for a discussion of this and










1996 1997 1998 1999
corporates/utilities
local/state/provincial authority banks other financials
supranationals
Source: Capital Data Bondware, 1999. Includes all international and domestic issues apart from auctioned domestic government
debt.
Note: Data up to 1998 refer to euro legacy currencies and ECU-denominated issues; in 1999, euro-denominated issues. All issue
amounts are provided in USD millions in order to give consistent comparisons with previous years .ECB Occasional Paper Series No. 1 • July 2000 48
Chart 17
Average size of corporate bond issues denominated in euro and euro legacy
currencies
Source: Capital Data Bondware, 1999. Includes all international and domest ic issues apart from auctioned bonds.
Note: Data up to 1998 refer to euro legacy currencies and ECU-denominated issues; in 1999, euro-denominated issues. All issue
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will increasingly be inclined to apply
for ratings. Another sign of the limited
development of the European credit market
is the fact that price information is still poor.
Trading is thought to be hampered by opaque
prices in some markets and institutional
investors sometimes have difficulty in
finding reliable prices for marked-to-market
valuations of their credit portfolios.
Notwithstanding the substantial progress
already achieved in the first year of EMU, by
comparison with the US corporate bond
market that of the euro area is still behind
regarding liquidity and market completeness.
The size of the European corporate bond
market, as measured by the market value of
outstanding issues, is also small in comparison
the US market (an estimated €700 billion
in Europe compared with €3,500 billion
in the United States). This being said, the
volume of new corporate issuance in the euro
area in 1999 brought it closer to its US
counterpart. A comparison relating to
international corporate bonds (i.e. excluding
domestic bonds for which issuance statistics
are difficult to compare on a consistent basis)
shows that euro-denominated issuance in
1999 was approximately 28% higher than
US dollar denominated issuance.
II.2.4 Asset-backed and structured
products
The increased focus of banks on their balance
sheet use and on the achievement of a high
return on equity not only gave rise to
increased corporate bond issuance, but also
gave a major impetus to the asset-backed
markets in the euro area. Such a form of
securitisation was fostered by an increased
appetite for new products among investors
looking for higher returns.
Mortgage portfolios are the main category of
bank assets demanded by investors. The
degree of market development for such assets
widely varies among euro area countries.
The most developed market is the
German “Pfandbriefe” market. In particular,
acceptance of the highly liquid Jumbo-
Pfandbriefe market is well established among
investors. Since the start of EMU, total Jumbo
issuance has roughly doubled; a substantial
share of the amount outstanding was held49 ECB Occasional Paper Series No. 1 • July 2000
outside Germany. This success can be
attributed to the combination of large issue
sizes and an efficient system of market
making. Following the German example, other
countries (i.e. France and Spain) set up similar
mortgage-backed markets. Nevertheless, the
44 This situation was starting to change, however, at the beginning
of 2000, as turnover in the MATIF ten-year “Notionnel” contract
grew substantially; the often argued technical superiority of that
contract might be the explanation.
asset pools backing mortgage portfolios are
not homogeneous, owing to differences in
the legal frameworks governing the various
national mortgage and housing markets. For
a pan-European market to develop, these legal
obstacles should be overcome.
II.3  Developments in secondary markets
While liquidity is usually a key factor in the
functioning of all markets, it is more visible for the
euro area bond markets, given the disappearance,
or significant reduction, of other sources of
differentiation among highly rated euro area
securities from an investor perspective (see also
Box 1). Liquidity tends to be increasingly
concentrated in benchmark issues, resulting in
higher spreads between on-the-run and off-the-
run issues. In some market segments, especially
credits and the off-the-run small-sized bonds of
some countries, liquidity diminished compared
with Stage Two of EMU. All in all, the euro bond
market has a long way to go before its secondary
market activity will be comparable with that
prevailing in the United States. Factors explaining
this situation are similar to those referred to
above with regard to primary market activity,
such as the non-homogeneity of sovereign
issuance in Europe (no single issuance calendar;
differing procedures) or the fact that the markets
for less creditworthy non-government bonds are
relatively underdeveloped.
While the information sources available
regarding activity in the secondary markets for
bonds are rather limited, available indicators
suggest that the secondary market for
government securities generally functioned
smoothly during 1999, and experienced an
increase in the nominal size of orders. Most
market participants suggest that formerly
standard DEM 20 million to DEM 50 million
deals were replaced with EUR 20 million to
EUR 50 million standard deals. Bid-ask spreads
were usually seen as little changed compared
with those prevailing prior to EMU. However,
those prevailing for benchmark issues (owing to
their cheapest-to-deliver status or their listing
on EuroMTS) seem to have narrowed markedly.
In the corporate market, the size of issues
has clearly increased (by two to three times),
which, together with a generally broader
investor base for the securities, has
contributed to bringing increased liquidity to
the secondary market. The average size of
customer transactions has also nearly doubled,
while bid-ask spreads have narrowed, thanks to
the presence of more market-makers. However,
overall secondary market activity has remained
uneven and limited.
II.4  Bond-related derivatives markets
II.4.1 Futures
The trading volumes of euro-denominated bond
futures have increased dramatically since the
beginning of 1999, indicating a high level of
turnover in euro-denominated bond markets.
While short-term interest rate futures were
dominated by contracts on LIFFE, in the course
of 1999 liquidity for bond futures was almost
exclusively centred on the German Bund
contracts of the German/Swiss derivatives
exchange, Eurex. The Bund future is widely used
as a hedging vehicle for all euro-denominated
issuance owing to the liquidity it offers to investors
and intermediaries, as a consequence of which
Bund futures are often the cheapest available
means of hedging.44 The basis risk entailed in this
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It is interesting to note that, compared with
the joint volumes traded on the US ten-year
and the long bond contracts (i.e. the relevant
comparison for the US futures market) the
turnover in the Bund contract was bigger
throughout 1999: the trading volume of the
Bund contract was steadily above the sum of
the two US contracts (see Chart 18).
As regards other new euro exchange-traded
instruments, such as multi-issuer contracts,
new lower notional coupon LIFFE contracts,
or swap-based futures, these did not succeed,
in the course of 1999, in generating a “critical
mass” able to attract investors and traders
and generate substantial liquidity. There may
be different reasons for the lack of liquidity.
Some financial intermediaries hold the
view that multi-issuer contracts, which were
launched by competing exchanges, will not
work. The cheapest-to-deliver bond of such
a contract is likely to be either the least
liquid or the worst rated bond included
in the basket, which would make it less
attractive than the Bund future contract.
While a reduction in the notional coupon
aimed at updating its level is in principle seen
as an appropriate step, it will not improve
the attractiveness of a future unless the
Chart 18
Ratio between volumes (expressed in euro) of ten-year Bund futures and US ten-year
long bond contracts
 (one-month moving average)
Source: Bloomberg.












contract is liquid enough. LIFFE did change
the notional coupon of its Bund future to
market levels. However, it did not seem to
modify the relative share of activity with
respect to Eurex, which maintained its
notional coupon at 6%. The success of other
efforts by LIFFE to launch a swap-based
contract seemed to be limited by the fact
that the swap community showed little
interest in providing liquidity in the future at
the expense of giving up the lucrative
bid-offer margins. In any case, a kind of
“vicious circle” is always at stake when it
comes to market liquidity: market participants
are reluctant to participate in a market
because of the absence of liquidity, and this
in turn exacerbates the illiquidity, while the
opposite happens as soon as one or other
factor turns the vicious circle into a virtuous
circle.
II.4.2 Swaps
The introduction of the euro led to an
expansion in the importance of swap markets
for euro area fixed income asset management
and hedging activities. A major factor in this
respect was the increase in corporate bond51 ECB Occasional Paper Series No. 1 • July 2000
issuance. The hedging of this increased
corporate issuance through the swap market
and increased swap market liquidity. The
trend towards hedging corporate bond
positions with swaps, rather than adopting
short positions in government paper or
futures, went further in 1999 following the
1998 liquidity crisis, during which government
bond futures proved to provide poor hedging
qualities for corporate bonds.
Furthermore, since the introduction of the
euro interest rate swaps have increasingly
been used as a valuation benchmark. The
homogeneity and liquidity provided by
interest rate swaps explain the observed
trend of their increasing use as a common
denominator for a comparison of relative
asset values between issues of different euro
area government bonds, as well as those
issued by supranational institutions and by
government agencies. The use of the swap
curve as a relative value tool is currently
commonplace with LIBOR-based institutions
and might gain importance in the absence of
a homogenous euro area benchmark curve.
II.4.3 Bond repos
As liquidity becomes an increasingly
important factor in the pricing of government
bonds within the euro area and, as a result,
benchmark premia increase, repo markets,
as a powerful liquidity-enhancing tool, are
becoming more and more important for
the  development of bond markets. Market
participants are, therefore, increasingly inclined
to conduct repo transactions and foresee a
considerable growth of the repo market for
euro area sovereign issues. However, it might
take some time before a European repo market
comes close to the US market in terms of size
or liquidity. More importantly, the current
fragmentation of clearing and settlement
systems is considered a major impediment to
further development of the European repo
market (see Section III).
II.4.4 Credit derivatives
The appetite for credit risk among
investors increased markedly in 1999. As a
consequence, for certain credit classes the
relevant corporate bonds were either too
illiquid to satisfy investor demand or even
non-existent. As a consequence, investor
demand for credit derivatives, notably default
swaps,45 developed as a means of taking on
credit risk. In the short term, the lack of
homogeneous documentation may be an
impediment to a rapid growth in credit
derivatives.46
45 A default swap is a derivative instrument whereby the underlying
issuer’s credit risk is transferred by the holder of the security to a
third party who is willing to bear it in return for a higher yield.
The initial holder’s benefit stems from its risk upgrading.
46 The legal background applicable in the event of a major default
may also raise problems. For example, the 1998 debt
moratorium in Russia highlighted differences in default definitions
in the various credit derivative instruments.
II.5 Market  participants
As in the case of money market activities,
since the start of Monetary Union most
financial intermediaries have restructured
their bond trading desks. In general, a switch
from a specialisation pattern focused on
countries towards a maturity-bucket or
credit-based specialisation (i.e. government,
agency, credit) has been implemented. A
number of banks have also been centralising
their trading activities in a single centre (in
some cases, this may be conditional upon the
need to have a physical presence to perform
primary dealer functions). At the same time the
number of sales teams has increased in order
to provide a global service to customers
through a decentralised structure, since a
local presence across the euro area is seen,
in some cases, as being useful for distribution
purposes.
The major players in the euro area bond
markets are a small group of European
universal banks and a handful of AmericanECB Occasional Paper Series No. 1 • July 2000 52
investment houses. In general, financial
intermediaries foresee increased competition
and consolidation as a consequence of the
restructuring of the banking industry. It is
thought that within a few years 10-15 key
players will dominate the euro area bond
markets. Banks with a sufficient size (in terms
of placing power, balance sheet, primary
dealerships and distribution network) are
expected to occupy the most prominent
places. Other small and medium-sized players
are expected to focus on customer needs or
specific market niches. An example is the
Pfandbriefe market, where German banks
have a head start over their competitors. As
a consequence, German banks are frequently
among the most active bond market players,
even though they are not as active in other
segments of the market.53 ECB Occasional Paper Series No. 1 • July 2000
The aim of this chapter is to identify and
analyse the main infrastructural barriers to
the integration of the euro interbank repo
and debt instrument markets and to propose
some actions in order to enhance the
integration of the existing infrastructure,
thereby increasing the integration of euro
money and financial markets.
It is broken down into two sections.
Section III.1 describes the different
components of the financial infrastructure of
III Infrastructure of the market
the money and bond markets. Section III.2
tries to pinpoint the areas in which particular
barriers to integration exist, to describe why
they are problematical and what initiatives
have been or may be taken primarily by the
markets to reduce these barriers. The
description and analysis provided in this
chapter take into account discussions held
with a representative group of users of the
financial infrastructure described.
III.1 General framework
This section describes the infrastructure
of the money and bond markets. The
infrastructure of these markets can be divided
into three groups of components: trading
platforms, clearing houses and settlement
(and payment) systems. The infrastructure
should be seen in the context of the
surrounding legal environment – including the
fiscal and accounting treatment of operations.
The components and their interaction are
illustrated in Chart 19 and described below.
A trade in the bond market or in the
secured money market may originate from
an organised trading platform or may take
place over the counter (OTC). It may go
through a clearing house or go directly to
settlement, and it needs settlement for both
the securities and the cash leg, preferably in
systems closely linked to one another.
From the point of view of settlement, the
case of the unsecured money market differs
from both the secured money market
and the bond market. As no collateral
is exchanged for the cash loan, an
uncollateralised loan only needs a payment
system for cash settlement. The settlement
of payments in euro mainly occurs via
TARGET (the Trans-European Automated
Real-time Gross settlement Express Transfer
system). TARGET offers the possibility of
transferring central bank money on a cross-
border basis as smoothly as domestically.
TARGET can be used for all transfers in euro
between EU countries. It processes both
interbank and customer payments and there
is no upper or lower limit to the amounts of
the payments which can be processed.
TARGET is a decentralised system in which
credit institutions keep their settlement
accounts with their home central bank.
Therefore, local payments continue to be
processed in the national RTGS systems.
Cross-border payments are processed
through the national RTGS systems and
are exchanged on a bilateral basis directly
between national central banks. Since its launch
in January 1999, the volume of cross-border
payments processed via TARGET has increased
to a level of close to 40,000 transactions
per day – representing a total daily value of
more than €400 billion. The number of
payments processed in TARGET as a whole,
i.e. cross-border and domestic payments taken
together, amounts to a daily average of more
than 187,000 (of which 147,000 are domestic),
representing a total daily value of more than
€1,000 billion (€605 billion).47
The fact that the unsecured money market
can rely on TARGET, while both the repo
and the bond markets also depend on the
securities settlement infrastructure, is the
47 See also “TARGET and payments in euro”, ECB, ECB Monthly
Bulletin, November 1999, pp. 41-52, and “The TARGET system”,
ECB, ECB Monthly Bulletin, March 2000, pp. 63*-64*, as well
as the ECB’s website (www.ecb.int) for the latest statistics
available on the use of TARGET and other euro payment
systems.ECB Occasional Paper Series No. 1 • July 2000 54
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SSS and payment systems
main reason why the unsecured money
market seems to be the most integrated
market in the euro area. Therefore, the rest
of this chapter will focus on the securities
side as – from an infrastructural point of
view – this is the main feature differentiating
the secured from the unsecured money
market.
For the settlement of securities, no highly
efficient, fully integrated system comparable
to TARGET exists, which covers the domestic
level as well as the cross-border level. Until
the start of Stage Three of EMU, the money
and bond markets were predominantly
national. There were a few international
markets based on the international central
securities depositories (ICSDs). The
segmentation of the national markets ran
along different fault lines, most of which
coincided with the national borders: currency,
standard contracts, tax and accounting
regimes, the structure of portfolios mainly
based on national assets, trading platforms,
market practices, central bank practices, and
clearing and settlement facilities for cash and
securities.
With the introduction of the single currency,
only three of the above-mentioned barriers
really changed – those relating to currency, the
settlement of cash and central bank practices.
First, the currency is now the same throughout
the euro area. Second, TARGET has been built
and is facilitating the efficient cross-border
settlement of cash. Finally, central bank practices
have become somewhat more similar, although
differences persist.
The other barriers have not really changed,
and although Monetary Union certainly sets
the stage for integration, further initiatives
will have to be taken – mainly, but not
exclusively, by the private sector – before
further integration of the market is achieved.
III.1.1 Trading in the euro securities
market
Trading in the euro money and bond markets
has historically taken place OTC. Lately,
some initiatives to create structured trading
platforms for these markets have emerged in
the euro area. Some of these are mentioned
below.
A common trading platform has been created
for the government bonds of seven major euro
area issuers (Belgium, Germany, Spain, France,
Italy, the Netherlands and Austria). The system
is called Euro-MTS. It is based on the original
Italian system MTS-PCT and is a screen-based
electronic system. It has recently introduced
features for trading repos directly, enabling its
participants to trade special and general
collateral repos at different maturity ranges.
The International Securities Market Association
(ISMA) has created a trading system called
COREDEAL for spot transactions and repo
operations on debt instruments.
The most recent announcements have been
the merger of the stock exchanges of Paris,
Brussels and Amsterdam into a single
entity called EURONEXT (for the trading
of equities, bonds and derivatives) and the
more equities-oriented merger of the London
and Frankfurt stock exchanges to form iX.
Moreover, talks are underway between the
iX partners, NASDAQ and the Madrid and
Milan exchanges. Finally, the EURONEXT
partners have announced a plan to create a
24-hour global equity market in co-operation
with the stock exchanges of Tokyo, New55 ECB Occasional Paper Series No. 1 • July 2000
York (NYSE), Australia, Hong Kong, Toronto,
Mexico and São Paulo.
Other market initiatives exist, such as the
development of a trading platform for repos
by Reuters and of an electronic platform by
some brokers.
The Eurosystem is observing the development
of trading structures with great interest.
However, only to a very limited extent does
it use trading platforms for its own purposes.
Therefore, the Eurosystem has not taken any
initiatives such as the issuance of standards
for trading platforms. To the extent that a
few trading systems emerge with a rather
large market share, this can enhance
integration in two ways. First, it will imply
that the traders have a common place to
look for counterparts to their trades. This in
itself is likely to accelerate market integration,
compared with the inherent inertia in an
OTC environment where there is a great
tendency to continue to trade with the same
counterparts. Second, the integration of
trading, the first step of the infrastructure,
may act as a driving force for integration
further down the infrastructure chain, i.e. for
clearing and settlement.
III.1.2 Matching, netting and clearing
houses in the euro securities
market
Matching  covers the activities related to
collecting the trade, matching it, confirming it
and transmitting it for settlement. These
functions could also be carried out by a
trading system, but if the market is
predominantly OTC, it may be particularly
useful to have another institution performing
this function.
Netting refers to the reduction in the amount
of processing or of the level of exposure by
offsetting a counterparty’s debit and credit
positions, leaving smaller obligations. Netting
concerns obligations both for cash and for
assets. Netting can be both bilateral and
multilateral. In the case of bilateral netting,
the result is to leave each pair of participants
with the smallest possible obligation towards
one another. In the case of multilateral
netting, netting is the setting-off of mutual
obligations leaving just a single obligation to
or from the counterparty for each netted
asset and for cash. The effect of all netting
methods is to reduce the need for liquidity
and assets to a minimum. In a world in
which there is increasing pressure for efficient
management of liquidity and assets, it is
beneficial to introduce netting into the
process as early as possible.
If all trades were made on the same
underlying assets, then the advantages of
netting would be the same for assets as for
cash. However, the traded assets are
typically heterogeneous and, therefore, the
gain achieved by netting is smaller for assets
than for cash. To increase the netting gain on
the assets side, the range of traded products
that can be netted is extended, thereby
performing so-called cross-product netting.
The idea of cross-product netting is to allow
netting between, for example, a repo and a
direct trade on the same underlying asset.
Until now, matching has frequently been
performed by the trading platforms, whereas
clearing has often been linked to the
settlement systems. With the emergence of
independent clearing houses in the euro area,
these functions may be taken over by such
institutions.
Clearing houses may also act as a central
counterparty, when they replace the original
counterparties in a trade and become the
single counterpart for all participants, thereby
assuming their counterparty risk. To manage
the risks taken over from the participants,
the central counterparty relies on initial
margins and margin calls, and, to cover
extreme situations, other measures, such as
own funds, dedicated members’ funds,
insurances and loss-sharing schemes. The
techniques used for margining are a key
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global cross-margining is used – balancing a
potential gain in one part of the participant’s
portfolio of outstanding trades with a loss in
another part – the collateral needed to
manage the risk can be reduced. In
an environment with a radically increased
number of potential counterparts, the
reduction of risks related to trading with less
well-known entities is helpful for the
integration of the market.
In the domestic securities infrastructure, the
establishment of clearing houses has not been
a general feature. At the euro area level,
however, independent clearing houses seem
to be a growing trend.
Given that independent clearing houses acting
as central counterparties did not exist in
most countries prior to EMU, this currently
represents the segment of the infrastructure
where there has been the greatest integration
so far. The two leading market initiatives, the
netting facilities of the London Clearing
House and Clearnet (France) have recently
come to an agreement to set up a common
clearing house with a central counterparty.
The Belgian and Dutch clearing houses could
also be associated with this project in line
with the EURONEXT project. Another major
market initiative is Eurex, the Swiss/German
clearing house. Eurex has so far cleared
only derivatives, but it may develop and
include other products. Other initiatives
have been taken domestically in some
countries. The success and impact of all these
institutions at the euro area level remain to
be seen.
III.1.3 Settlement in the euro
securities market
The settlement of securities refers to
the final discharge of the obligation of
counterparties on the one hand to deliver
financial instruments and on the other to pay
for them. Settlement normally occurs through
securities settlement systems (SSSs) on the basis
of delivery versus payment (DVP) procedures.
DVP is the principle of delivering the cash and
the securities simultaneously to the settlement
so that principal risk is entirely eliminated. 48
Before the beginning of Monetary Union, the
settlement structures were clearly divided
into national central securities depositories
(CSDs) and the two international central
securities depositories (ICSDs). The
distinction between these two types of
depositories is increasingly blurred and the
current situation is one of transition. There
seem to be two main models vying for the
future of European settlement. The main
difference is the degree of centralisation.
First, the European Central Securities
Depositories Association (ECSDA) has, inter
alia, defined a model for links49 between SSSs
aimed at maintaining full functionality at the
decentralised level. Since then, national CSDs
have been establishing new links or upgrading
the existing ones. Given that links used to be
one of the hallmarks of the ICSDs, the spread
of links to the CSDs has contributed to a
reduction in the distinction between the
practices of CSDs and ICSDs. The biggest
advantage of the links is that they can be
used to move securities irrespective of their
use, be it for central bank collateral or
whatever commercial purpose. However, a
great deal of work still needs to be carried
out before decentralised integration through
links is achieved. First, some SSSs remain
virtually unlinked and, second, those links
established so far are almost exclusively
free-of-payment links and only some are fully
automated. They are thus not the real-time
DVP links required for fully decentralised
integration. These obstacles have given rise
to a change of strategy involving the creation
of a “super-highway”, where a few large SSSs
48 For definitions of DVP see BIS, (1992). DVP can take place on a
real-time basis, i.e. each trade is settled as it enters the system,
or on a batch basis, where all trades entered into the system
during a certain period of time are settled in one batch, at the
end of which the net transfers of cash and securities take place.
Another way of settling securities transactions is free of payment,
where only the securities transfer takes place in the SSS (either
there is no cash to be transferred or the cash is transferred
separately through a different system or procedure).
49 For the latest version of the report, see ECSDA, June 2000,
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are connected to one another via efficient
DVP links. Each of these “hubs” is then
connected to a number of “satellites” or
“spokes”, i.e. the smaller SSSs. For this model
to be successful, it must be possible to move
a security efficiently from one satellite to
another through the hub or the super-
highway of hubs.
Second, two initiatives promoting a more
centralised integration of the settlement
infrastructure are under way. In May 1999
Cedelbank, the ICSD situated in Luxembourg
and DBC, the German CSD, announced their
merger, which became effective on 1 January
2000, creating Clearstream. The aim is to
integrate the systems fully within three years.
In December 1999 Euroclear, the Belgium-
based ISCD, and Sicovam, the French CSD,
announced their alliance. In March 2000 it
was confirmed that the intention was to
merge the two into Euroclear. Since then, it
has been announced that the Central Bank
of Ireland Securities Settlement Office,
which settles Irish government debt, will end
its operations and the activities will
be transferred to Euroclear. Both the
Clearstream and the Euroclear initiatives
represent a tendency towards the
centralisation of settlement and will have
a major impact on the integration of
the markets, compared with the current
decentralised infrastructure.
III.1.4 Legal environment
The legal environment actually goes beyond
what is the “pure” legislative framework of
the markets and encompasses issues such as
fiscal, accounting and contractual regimes. As
these have predominantly been domestically
determined, large differences persist even
though Directives issued by the European
Commission have gone a long way towards
ironing out some of the most cumbersome
differences.
In particular, the Investment Services
Directive, the Capital Adequacy Directive and
the Settlement Finality Directive deal with
issues of relevance for the financial markets.
Unfortunately, it seems that some important
details have yet to be implemented in a fully
harmonised way. For example, some EU
countries impose capital requirements for
the temporary transfer of ownership such as
repos, while others do not. Furthermore,
some key areas such as tax and, to some
extent, accounting are not covered by the
Directives.
The European Commission, the most
important driving force in this area, has
recently received assistance from the
Eurosystem on the legal acts of relevance for
the integration of the euro financial markets.
III.2 Barriers to integration
The barriers to integration in the area of
trading and, to a certain extent, of clearing
mostly relate to the multiple, heterogeneous
systems. However, the multiplicity and
heterogeneity of structures has a different
impact on the trading and clearing sides. If
two counterparts want to trade a given
instrument with each other, having more than
one system with which to do so is not really
a problem. If the systems are too expensive,
too slow or suffer from some other problem,
there is always the possibility of trading OTC.
It therefore seems that the barriers to
integration are mainly to be found in the
areas of settlement, the legal environment
and, less critically, the clearing area. The
following particular problems have been
identified and will be discussed in more detail:
1) the lack of availability of cross-border
settlement on a DVP basis;
2) the lack of standardised legal
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3) the lack of common practices concerning
settlement procedures;
4) the lack of harmonisation of
collateralisation processes between
central banks and interbank operations;
5) the heterogeneity in fiscal and accounting
procedures; and
6) the need for a clearing house.
III.2.1 Availability of cross-border
settlement on a DVP basis
An important issue for counterparties in the
money and bond markets concerns the lack
of procedures for the simultaneous cross-
border settlement of cash and securities,
i.e. the lack of cross-border securities
settlement on a DVP basis. At the domestic
level, DVP in central bank money has for
some time been the standard for the
settlement of securities transactions in the
interbank market. At the cross-border level
such a service is not yet provided. Until the
technical platforms of the merged entities
(Euroclear and Clearstream) become one,
links between SSSs will remain the only way
in which to settle an interbank transaction
on a cross-border basis. At present, links
are predominantly free of payment. To the
extent that they offer DVP settlement, they
only do so in private bank money. This
reduces risk but does not eliminate it,
because the risks on the settlement bank
remain. This may be one important reason
why the use of links – although growing –
remains limited compared with domestic
settlement and even with the cross-border
collateralisation taking place through the
correspondent central banking model
(CCBM50) (see Section III.2.4).
DVP can operate both on a batch basis and
on a real-time basis. The trend in the EU
settlement industry is clearly towards real-
time DVP settlement. This development has
partially been driven by one of the standards
of the ECB for the use of SSSs in central
bank credit operations, demanding real-time
settlement procedures for Eurosystem credit
operations.51 However, such procedures are
not yet available in most countries, not least
because investments in such systems require
significant lead times and technical and
financial resources. The bulk of DVP
settlement at the domestic level thus
continues to take place on a batch basis. For
developing real-time DVP links, SSSs must
first of all be able to offer real-time services
domestically. Furthermore, even if SSSs
are able to provide real-time settlement
for domestic transactions, this does not
automatically ensure the implementation of
real-time DVP links. Communication between
two real-time DVP systems may require
additional technical procedures.
For cross-border DVP facilities to be
implemented, the cross-border transfer of
securities – through the link – and the related
cross-border transfer of cash – through
TARGET – must be connected. If the DVP
facility needs to be in real-time, both of the
SSSs involved would also need to offer real-
time services.
The impact of the lack of real-time DVP
settlement differs between the various markets.
In the case of a simple purchase of a security
(settled, as a rule, on a T+3 basis52), the lack
of intraday DVP settlement is not particularly
problematical. There is time for the seller to
move the security through the link to an
50 The correspondent central banking model is an interim
model established by the ESCB to allow equal access for all
counterparties to all eligible collateral. It is a mechanism whereby
central banks act as custodians for one another to allow
counterparts to forward collateral on a cross-border basis. For
further details see ECB (1999a).
51 Standard 7 of ECB, 1998, “Standards for the use of EU SSSs in
ESCB credit operations” states that “SSSs must provide facilities
to settle certain ESCB operations (those involving intraday and
overnight credit) with intraday finality (i.e. settlement cannot be
reversed or unwound). SSSs must not expose NCBs to other
sources of settlement risk when they are settling operations with
counterparties in an SSS and/or via linked arrangements. SSSs
used for settlement of central bank transactions should have
facilities in place by 2002 to allow the option of intraday DVP
settlement in central bank money. This may take the form of
real-time gross settlement, or a series of batch processes with
intraday finality.”
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account in the SSS of the buyer and then to
settle the trade through a domestic DVP
process. By contrast, in the case of an
intraday repo, where money and cash are
exchanged several times in one day, a
procedure unable to settle with finality on an
intraday basis is not very useful. This could
explain why the euro area market for bonds
somehow seems to be more integrated than
the secured money market. It makes little
sense to make a cross-border deal in the
secured money market, if the flows of cash
and securities are not linked. If the exchange
of cash is not tied directly to the exchange
of collateral, one ends up with the
characteristics of an unsecured money market
deal. This is supported by the fact that the
share of the secured money market compared
with the unsecured is significantly lower in the
case of cross-border transactions compared
with the domestic market (see Table 1).
In sum, the current cross-border settlement
infrastructure may cater for some of the
needs of the bond market, whereas the
secured money market – particularly at the
short end, e.g. intraday repos – seems not to
be well served.
III.2.2 Lack of a uniform legal
framework
A problem for the development of a euro
money and bond market stems from the
differences between the various national legal
frameworks. The single currency area does
not coincide with a single jurisdiction.
Investigating these differences, understanding
which are important, finding ways in which
to operate cross-border in spite of them
and keeping track of changes is costly and
cumbersome.
The various Directives of the European
Commission concerning the development of the
Single Market for financial services laid the
foundations for legal integration. The Directive
of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 19 May 1998 on settlement finality in payment
and securities settlement systems has been
particularly helpful. An important further
initiative is the forthcoming Directive on
collateral, included in the recently adopted
framework for action on financial services.
Other initiatives have been driven mainly by
market participants trying to define uniform legal
documentation. The exercise is difficult owing
to the remaining differences in the legal systems
of the member countries.
A particular problem seems to exist for repos.
When the single monetary policy was being
prepared, an attempt was made to harmonise
the repo agreements between national central
banks (NCBs) and their counterparts; this
resulted in a non-binding template master
agreement. However, the existing divergence
between the national jurisdictions did not allow
for the implementation of a single master
agreement, and thus it was only implemented
by some NCBs and then only after national
modifications.
For the time being, one possible standard
contract is the initiative of ISMA – the Global
Master Repo Agreement (GMRA) based
exclusively on English law or US New York
law. This agreement was initially used only in
international repo contracts, but as these
grow in importance and some domestic
markets seem to be increasingly willing to
use the GMRA, it may become the de facto
standard, even though, for all countries
other than the United Kingdom, this will
then happen under a foreign (i.e. English)
jurisdiction. Various European federations
of banks agreed on a European Master
Agreement for repos (EMA) with the
intention of having the EMA replace the
“domestic” European standard agreements
including, in time, the GMRA.
Uniform legal documentation will certainly
help in the development of the euro repo
market. Further legal initiatives may also be
necessary, in particular through the current
draft of a European Directive on the cross-
border use of collateral, which aims at
eliminating all legal uncertainties surrounding
the establishment, enforcement and
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III.2.3  Lack of common practices
concerning settlement
procedures
Now, as before the start of Monetary Union,
the repo market (or, more generally, the
market for collateralised operations) is
operating in accordance with the rules and
practices of each trading place.
In accordance with local practices, repos can
be either general or specific. Specific
collateral repos require that the securities to
be delivered be clearly identified at the time
of entering into the repo. By contrast, general
collateral repos can be based on any of a
number of assets. To be eligible, the assets
must meet certain quality requirements,
e.g. the rating of the issuer, liquidity, the size
of the issue and the time to maturity, but the
asset is not identified before actual delivery
takes place. To achieve continued flexibility
after delivery, the collateral should also be
substitutable throughout the duration of the
repo. Having full flexibility with regard to the
underlying assets before and after settlement
assures maximum integration and liquidity of
the market.
Before the introduction of the euro, the
various domestic “general repos” were
based on domestic collateral only. With the
introduction of the euro, the integration
of financial markets should lead market
participants increasingly to use euro area
collateral irrespective of the country of issue.
As a consequence, a general repo could be
based on any collateral meeting the standard
quality requirements (e.g. all tier one assets).
This “Europeanisation” of general repos
seems to be taking place slowly. The bulk of
refinancing activity remains at the national
level and is based on domestic securities. In
addition to the legal obstacles mentioned in
Section II.2.2, a number of other factors
explain this. One is simple inertia, including
the slow internationalisation of the portfolios
of market participants. Another is the fact
that the settlement of non-domestic
securities is difficult and costly. Domestic
settlement systems still mainly provide
settlement facilities related to domestic
assets. Market participants would need
membership of several systems – directly or
through agents – in order to have access
to area-wide settlement. Even so, settlement
is complicated by the fact that procedures,
communication standards, services, operating
times, etc. differ between the individual
systems. This means that multiple
membership is costly, both in terms of
indirect costs of developing and maintaining
the necessary know-how, and in terms of
direct costs such as multiple membership fees
and a multi-system back office. Links and
mergers are slowly changing this, but there is
a long way to go before market participants
have easy and equal access to all eligible
collateral.
The effect of the lack of harmonisation of
procedures between SSSs, in particular with
regard to the settlement of repo and debt
instrument transactions, should be further
documented and analysed in order to identify
the most serious obstacles to area-wide equal
access to collateral.
III.2.4  Lack of harmonisation in the
collateralisation process
between central bank and
interbank operations
The central bank and interbank markets for
collateralised lending serve similar, but not
identical functions. They also rely on the same
collateral and the same SSS infrastructure. It
seems reasonable to assume that the better
integrated they are, the more efficient the
refinancing activity of the banking system as a
whole will be.
Moreover, irrespective of their market share,
central bank refinancing operations usually
have a large normative impact on the market.
First, central bank refinancing operations are
mandatory for any market player wishing to
be independent from competitors for
central bank money. Second, as central banks
traditionally focus on safety, security and
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easily form an agreeable benchmark for the
entire market. This may also be the case for
the technical procedures, the legal framework
and other aspects of market practices. In
addition, it is important to note that, although
it need not necessarily be so, the interbank
market for collateralised lending almost
exclusively uses repos in their various forms,
whereas the current use of pledges is more
or less restricted to central banks.
Central bank refinancing operations in
the euro area are based on a decentralised
infrastructure, using different legal instruments,
techniques and systems and with a cross-border
dimension based on the specific correspondent
central banking model (CCBM) procedure and
on eligible links between SSSs. At the start of
the EMU, this lack of harmonisation was not
considered to be a problem for the
implementation of the single monetary policy,
as no economic difference was seen between
the arrangements used by central banks. Hence
a single monetary policy could be implemented
through not completely harmonised systems and
procedures. Nevertheless, even if there was no
economic difference between the various
procedures, the practical consequence is a
barrier to the further integration of the market.
These barriers manifest themselves in two
particular areas: (1) legal and technical
differences, and (2) settlement procedures for
the cross-border use of collateral.
Prior to the introduction of the euro,
completely homogeneous legal frameworks,
techniques and systems with regard to the
acceptance of collateral did not necessarily
exist within individual countries. The
collateralisation techniques of the central
bank may have differed to a greater or lesser
extent from the technique(s) used in that
particular domestic market. However, with
the introduction of the euro, there is now a
multitude of legal frameworks, techniques and
systems both on the central bank side and on
the interbank side in the “domestic” euro
market. That is clearly a barrier to the full
integration of this market. In this respect,
reducing the number of arrangements –
ideally ultimately to only one type of
arrangement for all central bank operations –
would also help the integration of the
interbank euro repo market.
In addition, the need for collateral is
increasing, as is the need for intraday
settlement. A growing number of operations
are collateralised and RTGS procedures for
securities and payments are spreading.
All barriers to the efficient management of
collateral should therefore be considered,
with a view to improving the current
situation. A fully compatible and more
standardised legal framework, documentation
and set-up for the interbank and central bank
repo markets would help to resolve most of
these problems. Therefore, the effect of the
lack of harmonisation between central bank
procedures for collateralisation should be
further documented and analysed and
initiatives to harmonise practices should be
taken with a view to advancing the integration
of the euro repo market.
At present, the cross-border use of collateral
is settled via the correspondent central
banking model (CCBM) and, more recently
(as from July 1999), also by using some links
between SSSs. The CCBM has been crucial in
creating a common market for central bank
collateral. However, when considering the
repo market as a whole, there are some
barriers inherent in the CCBM.
First, the CCBM can be used only for central
bank credit and not for interbank repos or
debt instrument operations.
Second, in the CCBM normally only the
central bank in the country of issue acts as
a correspondent for the lending or home
central bank. This creates a need for
“repatriation” of those assets which are not
kept in their country of issue, but which have
been moved to another SSS. These assets can
be used via the CCBM only after having been
“repatriated” to the country of issue. This is
slowing down the cross-border use of
collateral and therefore has a negative
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the securities, effectively leading to a
segmentation of the markets.
This problem can be reduced in some cases.
For instance, the development of eligible
links will limit the problem of the repatriation
of collateral. The merger of SSSs will
also eliminate the problem of repatriation
between the two merged SSSs.
A further problem with the CCBM is its
relative slowness and limited operating times.
As an interim solution, it is based more or
less on manual processing. Furthermore, it
necessitates the involvement of additional
entities such as custodians and “foreign” SSSs,
and it therefore takes time to mobilise or
return collateral through the model. This
may be considered as problematical,
especially if repatriation is necessary.
III.2.5 Heterogeneity in fiscal regimes
and regulation
Market participants have reported that
heterogeneity in fiscal regimes and regulation,
for the treatment of debt instrument
operations and repos, is hindering the smooth
development of a euro market. The main
reasons are the differences in treatment
depending on the legal jurisdiction in which
counterparties are located.
On the tax-related aspects, the fundamental
problem concerns the differences in the
taxation of investment income from various
instruments, which has given rise to cross-
border distortion and entire markets being
moved into or out of particular countries.
Furthermore, for repos, the tax treatment is
not harmonised yet and this is hindering full
integration or is pushing for the delocalisation
of these activities, which are penalised in one
particular country. This can limit the
possibility of moving securities from one
country to another and creates difficulties
and complexities for the treatment of
corporate events, and the payment of interest
on debt instruments.
Concerning the regulatory aspects, the
problem is the transposition of the Capital
Adequacy Directive (CAD) for repos, which
is not uniform among Member States. For
instance, some local authorities consider
that repos conducted with an appropriate
risk management procedure with haircuts and
a daily margining process, such as tripartite
repos, do not need any capital requirement,
although some other authorities would apply
a capital requirement in accordance with the
quality of the issuer of the securities used as
collateral.
III.2.6 Need for a clearing house
Although the presence or absence of a
clearing house cannot be considered as an
actual barrier to the integration of the market
infrastructure, the development of such
services in the market could help integration.
Indeed, the benefits of the activities of the
clearing house, in particular for netting, are
dependent on volume, and so it is likely that
there will be a race to become the clearer
for the euro securities markets. The
emergence of a single clearer will also benefit
the integration of the market. Even if many
trading platforms remain unconnected to one
another and no dominant one emerges, these
disparate systems may all connect to one
clearing system which, in turn, would connect
to several settlement systems. A large
independent clearer would therefore go a
long way towards the integration of the
market.
The clearing system could also be part of one
SSS and serve it exclusively. However, limiting
settlement activities to a single SSS (in a
market with several SSSs) would limit the
potential volumes to be offset. Moreover,
whereas trading and settlement institutions
do not incur or manage any risk, clearing
with a central counterparty does involve risks.
Mixing a risk management business with trade
and settlement functions that are theoretically
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As a result, the business case for clearing
houses lies in the fact that they enable
participants to save liquidity and, in the case
of central counterparties, to take over
certain risks from market participants. Less
importantly, and to the extent that settlement
volumes are significantly reduced through
netting, part of the operational risk shifts
from the SSSs to the clearers. In any
case, the potential volumes that a dominant
clearing house covering the whole of the euro
area would attract would mean that quite a
significant risk would be concentrated in,
and therefore have to be managed by, that
institution. Mismanagement of such business
could have a large negative impact on the
market: first, as a result of its systemic
implications and, second, on account of the
fact that it would set back the process of
centralisation. The Eurosystem is interested
in the increased efficiency offered by these
institutions, but given the potential systemic
risk inherent in their business, may consider
the possibility of setting standards and
establishing a co-operative framework for an
oversight regime which would take into
account the pan-European nature of the
activities of such institutions.
In addition, it should be mentioned that the
benefit from an individual trade going through
a clearing house depends on the time to
settlement of the trade in question. An
intraday repo, where cash and securities are
to be exchanged twice a day to obtain an
immediate liquidity effect, and where market
risk is limited because of the short time to
settlement, will benefit less from a clearing
house than other products with a longer
settlement lag.
The recent agreement between Clearnet and
the netting services of the London Clearing
House to create a single clearing house
with an area-wide dimension is a positive
step towards integrating the market.
In conclusion, the emergence of a more
efficient clearing function in the euro area
should take place in line with the following
principles: 1) not limiting such an entity to
only one SSS; 2) avoiding a multiplicity of
clearing houses, which would reduce the
efficiency of such a system in the market
infrastructure; 3) focusing their activity on
the clearing of operations other than intraday
operations; and 4) developing cross-product
netting or global clearing in order to increase
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Glossary
Annex 1
Arbitrage: profiting from differences in price when the same security, currency or commodity
is traded in two or more markets.
Bank certificates of deposit (CDs): short-term securities issued by banks.
Bid-ask spread: differential prevailing in the market between the bid price and the offered
price.
Bons à Taux Fixe (BTF): French Treasury bill.
Bubill: German Treasury bill.
Buoni Ordinari del Tesoro (BOT): Italian Treasury bill.
Central counterparty: an intermediary which takes over the obligation of either side in
respect of a trade. After clearing with a central counterparty, the two trading parties no
longer have an obligation towards each other, but rather towards the central counterparty,
which thereby assumes any replacement cost risk resulting from market moves between the
time of trade and the time of settlement.
Certificati del Tesoro zero cupon (CTZ): Italian government debt instrument issued at
discount with a maturity of up to two years.
Certificati di Credito del Tesoro (CCT): Italian government bond with a maturity of
seven years.
Clearing: the process of transmitting, reconciling and, in some cases, confirming the payment
order and the securities transfer prior to settlement. In the context of repos, this can have
three separate aspects: confirmation/matching, netting and clearing with the central
counterparty.
Commercial paper (CP): short-term securities issued by corporations.
Confirmation/matching: the process of ensuring that the two counterparties agree with
regard to the terms of the repo – price, asset(s), value dates, settlement data, including
relevant account numbers – before the payment and transfer orders are sent for settlement.
Depo/repo spread:  differential prevailing in the market between the interest rate of
unsecured and secured transactions.
Deposit facility: a standing facility of the Eurosystem which counterparties may use to make
overnight deposits at the central bank which are remunerated at a pre-specified interest rate.
Eurex: German futures and options exchange market.
EURIBOR: the euro area interbank offered rate for the euro, sponsored by the European
Banking Federation (EBF) and the Association Cambiste Internationale (ACI). It is an index price
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Euro overnight index average (EONIA): the overnight rate computed as the euro area
interbank offered overnight rate for the euro. It is computed as a weighted average of all
overnight unsecured lending transactions in the interbank market, initiated within the euro
area by the contributing panel of 57 prime banks.
EURODEM: interbank offered rate for the Deutsche Mark, negotiated outside Germany.
EUROLIRA: interbank offered rate for the Italian lira, negotiated outside Italy.
European Master Agreement:  legal contract sponsored by the European Banking
Federation and the European Savings Banks Association, which aims to consolidate into a
single set of harmonised documents various master agreements used within the euro area and
certain neighbouring countries, particularly for repurchase transactions and securities lending.
European System of Central Banks (ESCB): the European Central Bank and the national
central banks of the EU Member States.
Eurosystem: the European Central Bank and the national central banks of the EU Member
States which have adopted the euro.
Foreign currency swap: an agreement between two parties to exchange future payments in
one currency for payment in another currency. These agreements are used to transform the
currency denomination of assets or liabilities.
Forward rate agreement (FRA): cash-settled forward contract on a Eurodollar deposit.
General collateral: collateral which, owing to its homogeneous features, is broadly accepted.
Interest rate swap (IRS): exchange between two parties of a fixed interest rate instrument
for a floating interest rate instrument.
Junk bond: high-yield bond with a credit rating of BB or lower.
LIFFE: London futures and options exchange market.
Main refinancing operation (MRO): regular lending operation against underlying assets
executed on the initiative of the central bank in the financial markets.
Marginal lending facility: standing facility of the Eurosystem which counterparties may use
to receive overnight credit against a pre-specified interest rate.
Matif: French futures and options exchange market.
Mercato Interbancario di Depositi (MID):  Italian screen-based market for interbank
deposits.
MIBOR: interbank offered rate in Madrid for unsecured transactions.
Monetary Financial Institutions (MFIs):  financial institutions which form the money-
issuing sector of the euro area. It includes the Eurosystem, resident credit institutions as
defined in Community law and all other resident financial institutions whose business is to67 ECB Occasional Paper Series No. 1 • July 2000
receive deposits and/or close substitutes for deposits from entities other than MFIs and, for
their own account (at least in economic terms), to grant credit and/or invest in securities. The
latter group consists predominantly of money market funds. At the end of 1999, there were
9,443 MFIs in the euro area (12 central banks, 7,906 credit institutions, 1,517 money market
funds and 8 other financial institutions).
Money market fund (MMF): fund that invests in short-term securities.
Mortgage bond: bond issue secured by a mortgage on the issuer’s property, the lien on
which is conveyed to the bondholders by a deed of trust.
Netting: the process of offsetting cash or securities positions. Through netting, the gross
positions are reduced. This is particularly true for the cash side, as all cash is fungible,
whereas all assets are not.
OTC (over-the-counter): OTC is a bilateral way of trading, where the buyer and seller
contact each other directly, e.g. by telephone, without going through an organised exchange.
Pfandbriefe: German mortgage bonds.
PIBOR: interbank offered rate in Paris for unsecured transactions.
Pledge:  legal arrangement by means of which the borrower pledges some assets to the
lender in order to collateralise a credit. By contrast with a repo, a pledge can only be used to
generate cash credit.
Primary dealer: selected credit institution authorised to buy and sell original issuance of
government securities in direct dealing with the Treasury.
Real-time gross settlement (RTGS) system: a settlement system in which processing
and settlement take place on an order-by-order basis (without netting) in real time
(continuously).
Repo: financial instrument which serves to exchange cash temporarily for securities for a
predetermined period. Various legal arrangements exist to perform this basic economic
function (repurchase agreements, reverse repurchase agreements, sell/buybacks and securities
lending). All forms of repos entail a change in ownership.
Reserve maintenance period: period over which compliance with reserve requirements is
calculated. For the ESCB this would be one month, starting on the 24th calendar day of each
month and ending on the 23rd calendar day of the following month.
Reserve requirement:  requirement for institutions to hold minimum reserves with the
central bank.
Special collateral: collateral other than general collateral.
TARGET (Trans-European Automated Real-time Gross settlement Express
Transfer system):  TARGET is the RTGS payment system for the euro. It consists of
15 national RTGS systems and the ECB payment mechanism, which are interlinked so as to
provide a uniform platform for the processing of cross-border payments.ECB Occasional Paper Series No. 1 • July 2000 68
Tier one assets: marketable assets fulfilling certain uniform euro area-wide eligibility criteria
specified by the ECB. Among these criteria are the requirements that they must be
denominated in euro, be issued (or guaranteed) by entities located in EEA countries, and be
located in a national central bank or SSS of the euro area.
Tier two assets: marketable or non-marketable assets for which specific eligibility criteria
are estabilised by the national central banks, subject to ECB approval.
Treasury bill: short-term government debt instrument issued at discount with a maturity of
one year or less.
Treaty:  the Treaty establishing the European Community. It comprises the original EEC
Treaty (Treaty of Rome) as amended by the Treaty on European Union (signed in Maastricht
on 7 February 1992).
UCITS: undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities.
Zero coupon bond: security issued at discount or a security which delivers a single coupon
at maturity.69 ECB Occasional Paper Series No. 1 • July 2000
The ESCB market surveys
Annex 2
The ESCB market surveys referred to in this
Paper were conducted in the context of the
studies on the money market and on the
bond market mentioned in the Foreword.
As regards the money market study, two
different surveys were conducted, one
focusing on the unsecured, the repo and the
foreign currency swap markets, and one on
the market for Treasury bills and other short-
term paper.
The survey on the unsecured, the repo and the
foreign currency swap markets was mainly
quantitative, although some qualitative questions
were included with the help of the NCBs to
improve the understanding of the data obtained.
The result of the quantitative survey is
summarised in Table 1 of this Annex. It covered
two periods chosen to identify, to the extent
possible, the effects of the introduction of the
euro on the relevant segments of the market,
namely the fourth quarter of 1998 and the
second quarter of 1999 (the latter was preferred
to the first quarter of 1999 in order to avoid
distortions related to the very first period after
the introduction of the euro). The data reflect
responses from 75 banks located in 7 euro area
countries, with the following geographical
distribution: 14 in Germany; 7 in Finland; 16 in
France; 10 in Ireland; 11 in Italy; 10 in Portugal
and 7 in Spain.
Other relevant details on the coverage on
the unsecured, the repo and the foreign
currency swap markets are as follows:
1) Reflects data from responses to ESCB market survey by seven euro area countries (Germany, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy,
Portugal and Finland). Some discrepancies appear between the upper and lower parts of the table owing to errors in reported
data by counterparts.
2) Transactions effective on the day after the contract (t + 1), maturing one day later (t + 2).
3) The breakdown only contains figures over three months.
Table 1
Euro money market turnover 1)
(daily transactions average in EUR millions)
Unsecured Repo Swap against
transactions transactions foreign currencies
1999 1998 Variation 1999 1998 Variation 1999 1998 Variation
Q2 Q4 as a % Q2 Q4 as a % Q2 Q4 as a %
Breakdown of lending
transactions by maturity
Overnight 61,197 42,927 42.6 10,727 8,123 32.1 9,718 9,654 0.7
Tom next 2) 9,062 8,794 3.0 11,916 9,289 28.3 15,383 18,944 -18.8
1 week 11,118 14,561 -23.6 8,983 7,378 21.7 2,689 3,486 -22.9
2 weeks 1,883 1,826 3.1 2,665 3,045 -12.5 2,316 2,301 0.7
1 month 1,986 2,408 -17.5 2,773 2,248 23.3 3,800 7,651 -50.3
3 months 1,984 3,197 -37.9 1,776 1,244 42.8 3,010 5,079 -40.7
6 months 704 1,553 -54.7 333 433 -23.2 1,160 2,156 -46.2
9 months 189 552 -65.8 109 148 -26.4 568 1,350 -58.0
1 year 403 450 -10.6 344 136 153.3 490 606 -19.1
> 1 year 79 32 145.6 20 5 303.0 185 243 -23.9
Total 88,605 76,302 16.1 39,646 32,049 23.7 39,318 51,471 -23.6
Breakdown of transactions
by type of counterparty 3)
Domestic counterparties
– borrowing 25,988 32,487 -20.0 16,257 13,220 23.0 2,894 1,985 45.8
– lending 39,534 43,900 -9.9 14,917 11,759 26.9 5,574 10,926 -49.0
Euro area
– borrowing 11,312 7,391 53.1 6,470 3,715 74.2 2,856 1,995 43.1
– lending 30,753 13,167 133.6 11,394 9,209 23.7 17,871 18,387 -2.8
Others
– borrowing 4,835 4,430 9.1 7,078 2,891 144.8 2,420 5,280 -54.2
– lending 11,668 7,094 64.5 8,414 7,012 20.0 12,709 17,921 -29.1ECB Occasional Paper Series No. 1 • July 2000 70
All data (for the unsecured deposit market,
repo market and foreign currency swap
market) include only transactions between
credit institutions. In particular, repo market
data do not include transactions with central
banks.
Repo transactions include all collateral
(general and special) and also sell/buyback
transactions and securities lending against
cash.
The survey on the market for Treasury bills
and other short-term paper was also mainly
quantitative, but nonetheless had a qualitative
component. Its main findings are shown in
Tables 3, 4 and 5 of this Paper, together with
some details on the coverage (see the notes
to the tables). It covered the second half of
1998 and the first half of 1999. The data
were provided by the relevant NCBs and
reflect a variety of sources including NCB
data and other official statistics, where
available (mainly regarding Treasury bills
data), and estimates based on ad hoc market
surveys conducted by the NCBs. They include
euro-denominated instruments. Turnover
figures refer to total and outright transactions
conducted in the period (i.e. no daily
averages).
The survey on the bond market was of a
qualitative nature. The reason for this was
that, on the one hand, data availability for
bond markets is relatively good compared,
for instance, with that for the money market.
Relatively exhaustive interviews were held
with credit institutions (14 as a whole) and
various categories of final investors (14 as a
whole, including insurance and reinsurance
companies and pension funds) located in 4
countries, namely France (3 credit institutions
and 4 institutional investors); Germany (5
credit institutions and 4 institutional
investors); the Netherlands (3 credit
institutions and 4 institutional investors; and
the United Kingdom (3 credit institutions and
3 institutional investors). The choice of the
banks and investors to be interviewed was
made with a view to ensuring that the results
would be representative and fully reliable.71 ECB Occasional Paper Series No. 1 • July 2000
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Annex 3
On the grounds of the fairly high degree of
integration shown by different domestic
markets – at least at the shortest maturities –
looking at the evolution of bid-ask spreads
on the MID may throw some light on the
overall EU interbank market. For this
purpose, differences between hourly averages
of bid-ask rates – taken as a proxy for actual
bid-ask spreads – have been related to daily
coefficients of variation of interest rates and
to a dummy variable for the last day of
the reserve maintenance period, on the
assumption that bid-ask spreads are likely to
widen as uncertainty on interest rates (caught
by daily coefficients of variation) increases
and on the last day of the reserve
maintenance periods.1 Both the assumptions
seem to be confirmed, but in 1999 spreads
were slightly narrower (on average from
1.5 basis points to around 3 basis points). This
change may be explained mainly in terms of
improved competition – also in the domestic
segment of the interbank market – which the
enlargement of the market has brought about
(in Stage Three the intercept is about 1 basis
point lower) and, to a lesser extent, in terms
of the lower volatility of interest rates. No
significant change seemed to have occurred
in the sensitivity of spreads with regard to
interest rate variability and to the last day of
the reserve maintenance period (which
remained steady at some 5 basis points).
1 In order to check for some Stage Three effects on spreads and on their sensitivity to interest rate variability and days at the end of
a reserve maintenance period, the following functions have been estimated (data refer to overnight interest rates on the MID in
the period between 1 January 1998 and 13 September 1999):
SPR = 0.0186 – 0.0091* STAGE3 + 0.0045*CV + 0.0538*RES + 0.0004*CVXSTG3-0.0182*RESXSTG3
(t=7.36) (t=-2.29) (t=13.39) (t=4.79) (t=0.26) (t=-0.85)
(p>|t|=0.0001) (p>|t|=0.0225) (p>|t|=0.0001) (p>|t|=0.0001) (p>|t|=0.7958) (p>|t|=0.3951)
R2 = 0.37
F  = 50.83
D.W. d = 1.92
SPR = 0.0189 – 0.0095* STAGE3 + 0.0045*CV + 0.0482*RES
(t=7.59) (t=-2.56) (t=13.81) (t=5.38)
(p>|t|=0.0001) (p>|t|=0.0108) (p>|t|=0.0001) (p>|t|=0.0001)
R2 = 0.37
F  = 84.71
D.W. d = 1.90
where:
SPR = ON interest rate bid-ask spread
STAGE3 I = 0 in 1998
                I = 1  in 1999
CV = daily coefficient of variation of ON
interest
RES         I = 1 on the last days of reserve
maintenance periods
                I = 0  on the other days
CVXSTG3 = STAGE3*CV
RESXSTG3 = STAGE3*RESECB Occasional Paper Series No. 1 • July 2000 7273 ECB Occasional Paper Series No. 1 • July 2000
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